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ABSTRACT 
  In 2004, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Norton v. Southern 
Utah Wilderness Association (SUWA), that environmentalists could 
not obtain injunctive relief against the failure of the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) to regulate growing off-road vehicle (ORV) use 
in federal wilderness study areas in Utah, despite a statutory directive 
that BLM prevent “impairment” of such areas, and despite BLM’s 
promises in its land plan that it would monitor ORV use and close 
the areas if warranted.  The Court acknowledged that the 
Administrative Procedure Act authorized federal courts to compel 
action in the face of agency inaction.  However, the Court held that 
BLM’s failure to act to prevent impairment was not actionable 
because Congress had not directed BLM to take a “discrete” action, 
instead leaving the agency with considerable discretion as to how to 
prevent impairment.  The decision in SUWA has produced 
widespread ramifications: federal land managers have employed it to 
successfully insulate from judicial review a wide variety of federal 
actions as well as inactions.  Moreover, the Bush Administration 
seized upon the decision as a justification for redefining national 
forest land plans as aspirational in nature, without making any 
binding commitments as to particular authorized activities or land 
suitability.  The Administration also moved to eliminate 
environmental review of national forest plans, claiming that, under 
its redefinition, plans produce no environmental effects, an effort that 
was subsequently stalled by the courts. 
  This article discusses these developments, maintaining that they 
are inconsistent with the congressional commitment to federal land 
planning made in 1976 in both the Federal Land Management and 
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Policy Act and the National Forest Management Act.  Thirty years 
ago, Congress created modern federal land planning as the 
cornerstone of greater public involvement in public land decision 
making.  SUWA and its aftermath have destroyed that vision, 
making public land plans virtually irrelevant and a large waste of 
taxpayer dollars.  If effective public participation in federal land 
planning requires that the public be able to enforce the promises 
made in land plans, Congress must amend the authorizing statutes to 
restore federal land plans as legally significant commitments of 
public resources. 
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In 1976, Congress committed to land use planning on federal 
public lands by enacting both the National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA)1 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(FLPMA).2  Signing NFMA into law, President Ford announced that 
the statute “reaffirms and further defines the concept of multiple use-
 1. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976). 
 2. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976). 
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sustained yield management and outlines policies and procedures for 
land management planning in the national forest system. . . .  [T]his 
act guarantees the public full opportunity to participate in National 
Forest land and resource planning.”3  Actually, the Forest Service has 
engaged in some form of planning since the turn-of-the-century days 
of Gifford Pinchot, although the agency conducted its planning 
activities without significant congressional oversight or formal public 
involvement until the 1970s.4 
As it did in NFMA, Congress in FLPMA incorporated the 
principles of multiple use management from the 1960 Multiple-Use 
Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) into its management requirements.5  
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the product of a 1946 
merger between the Grazing Service and General Land Office, had 
engaged in little systematic planning during the first thirty years of its 
existence.6  Thus, FLPMA marked a fundamental shift in the 
management of BLM’s public lands, providing BLM with organic 
 3. DENNIS C. LE MASTER, DECADE OF CHANGE: THE REMAKING OF FOREST SERVICE 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY DURING THE 1970S 78 (1984), citing 3 PUB. PAPERS 2619-21(Oct. 22, 
1976). 
 4. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE 
PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 15 (Island Press 1987). 
 5. See George Cameron Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management IV: 
FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 1, 6 (1983) (observing that, with 
little debate, Congress based FLPMA’s multiple use management requirements on the Forest 
Service’s 1960 MUSYA). 
 6. See George Cameron Coggins & Parthenia Blessing Evans, Multiple Use, Sustained 
Yield Planning on the Public Lands, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 411, 447 (1982) (noting that the lack of 
adequate funding and planning authority for the agency contributed to the general lack of BLM 
planning during the first decades of its existence).  Congressionally-directed BLM planning 
began in 1969, when BLM began to implement the Classification and Multiple-Use Act of 1964 
(CMUA).  43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970).  The CMUA required BLM to prepare 
Management Framework Plans for the lands under its control and provided the Secretary of 
Interior with greater authority to classify public lands for disposal or retention as federal public 
lands.  When the Public Land Law Review Commission issued its report on the nation’s public 
lands in 1970, which automatically caused the CMUA to expire, 180 million acres of federal land 
had been classified or reclassified under the CMUA.  GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT 
L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW §10D:21 (2007).  See also George 
Cameron Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning On the Federal Lands, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 307, 317 (1990) (describing planning under the CMUA as “early and primitive” 
and noting that such plans were developed following a different procedure, and contained 
different information, than plans that would later be developed under FLPMA); Lujan v. Nat’l 
Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 876 (1990) (discussing the classification provisions of the CMUA).  
See also infra note 66 (discussing BLM’s formation). 
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authority for the first time.7 FLPMA also made planning the 
centerpiece of BLM land management.8 
In NFMA and FLPMA, Congress assigned federal land 
managers new responsibilities, while reining in their discretion by 
subjecting them to public accountability and scrutiny.9  Both statutes 
reflected a federal commitment to public involvement, congressional 
oversight, and long-range planning as the central tenets of public land 
decision making.10 
But federal land planning has been emasculated in the 21st 
century, as the Supreme Court has ruled that land use plans are not 
ripe for judicial review,11 and that plan terms are not enforceable.12  
These decisions have led at least the Forest Service to conclude that 
land plans are merely aspirational statements of good intentions, and 
that plans require no analysis of their environmental effects under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).13  These developments 
have fundamentally altered the nature of land planning on federal 
public lands, removing the public from the planning process and 
insulating agencies from challenges to planning decisions.  Congress 
intended public planning to be the fulcrum of FLPMA and NFMA, 
but recent changes in Forest Service planning regulations have 
undermined the public planning process.14  These regulatory changes 
seem designed to impose limits on environmental challenges to 
agency decisions at the programmatic level, which will produce 
 7. Coggins, supra note 5, at 26-27.  On the significance of organic statutes, see Robert L. 
Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic 
Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L. Q. 457 (2002). 
 8. See Coggins, supra note 5, at 15.  See also S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES, 
95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT 
OF 1976 (1978). 
 9. S. REP. NO. 94-583, at 7 (1975), reprinted in S. COMM. ON ENERGY & NAT. 
RESOURCES, 95TH CONG., supra note 8, at 72. 
 10. See SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 339 (2d ed. 1980). 
 11. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998). 
 12. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004). 
 13. See National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, 
Revising, or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481 
(Dec. 15, 2006) (categorically excluding Forest Service forest plans developed under the 2005 
planning rule from NEPA analysis); see also infra notes 306-09 and accompanying text 
(discussing the 2006 forest planning categorical exclusion). 
 14. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (Jan. 5, 
2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 219) (describing the Forest Service’s revised regulations 
for NFMA forest planning); see also infra notes 271-93 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Bush Administration’s 2005 planning rule). 
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piecemeal litigation and shield a wide swath of public land use 
decisions from judicial review.  The result is the effective 
abandonment by at least one land management agency of the 
considerable public resources devoted to the planning process over 
the past three decades.15  This article maintains that these 
developments represent a giant leap backward for federal land 
management agencies and argues that Congress must restore federal 
land planning and return to its roots if the public is to participate 
effectively in agency decision-making processes. 
Effective federal land planning suffered a serious blow in 2004, 
when a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance (SUWA) that a plan provision stating that BLM 
“will” monitor off-road vehicle (ORV) use was not a legally binding 
commitment.16  Environmentalists sued under section 706(1) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,”17 arguing that BLM’s 
failure to control or even monitor ORV use within wilderness study 
 15. NFMA requires the Forest Service to prepare a forest plan every fifteen years for each 
of the 155 national forests it manages, at an estimated cost of $5 million to $7 million per plan.  
See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5) (2000) (requiring plans be revised whenever the Secretary finds a 
forest’s conditions have changed “significantly” but at least every fifteen years); see also In One 
of His Last Acts, Bosworth Defends Planning Rule, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, Jan. 19, 2007, at 5.  
Unlike the Forest Service, BLM does not have statutory or regulatory timelines for plan 
revisions.  See 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-6 (2006) (requiring BLM to revise land use plans “as 
necessary, based on . . . new data, new or revised policy and changes in circumstances affecting 
the entire plan or major portions of the plan”). 
Planning is expensive, but one of the congressional goals in establishing the planning 
process was to ensure better funding for the Forest Service, so that the agency would have 
sufficient resources to make informed and reasoned decisions that took into account a wider 
range of information and interests than commodity production.  In the five years following 
NFMA’s passage, Forest Service appropriations nearly doubled.  LEMASTER, supra note 3, at 
151.  In recent years, however, the Forest Service’s budget has been slashed: President Bush’s 
2008 budget proposed reducing Forest Service funding from the previous year by $64 million, 
resulting in a budget request for the agency totaling $4.1 billion.  Rocky Barker, Forest Service 
Money Is Drying Up, IDAHO STATESMAN, May 13, 2007, at 1.  While appropriations for land 
use planning have been relatively flat in recent years, with $52.6 million marked for planning for 
2008, or 1.28% of the agency’s budget, the proportion of the Forest Service budget consumed by 
firefighting costs has increased dramatically. Id.  In 2006, the agency spent $1.6 billion fighting 
fires, more than 40% of its entire budget.  Id.  See also infra notes 79-91 and accompanying text 
(discussing Forest Service spending on land use planning). 
BLM’s budget was also reduced for 2008, although less dramatically: BLM’s 2008 budget of 
$1.85 million is just $5 million less than its 2006 budget.  See Bush’s Budget, 2008, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS, Mar. 5, 2007, at 3; see also infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing 
BLM spending on land use planning). 
 16. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72. 
 17. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000). 
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areas (WSAs) in Utah violated both FLPMA and NEPA.18  Although 
the Tenth Circuit agreed that FLPMA required BLM to take action 
to preserve the wilderness characteristics of WSAs and manage the 
lands consistent with applicable land management plans,19 and that 
NEPA required the agency to take a “hard look” at whether it 
needed to supplement its environmental impact statement (EIS) on 
the land plan to account for a substantial increase in ORV use,20 the 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Court held that while FLPMA required BLM to manage 
WSAs in a manner not to impair wilderness characteristics, the 
agency possessed wide discretion to decide how to comply with this 
statutory directive, and thus BLM need not ban ORV use in the 
areas.21  Further, the SUWA court ruled that although BLM may not 
act in a manner inconsistent with a land plan, a plan’s provisions are 
not usually judicially enforceable because land plans only guide, not 
generally prescribe, actions.22  The Court also decided that even 
though BLM’s decision to approve a land use plan may require 
NEPA analysis, once approved there is no further “major Federal 
action” involved in a land use plan requiring EIS supplementation.23 
The SUWA decision echoed a conclusion the Court reached in 
the context of national forest plans six years earlier.  In 1998, in Ohio 
Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, the Court ruled that 
 18. FLPMA required BLM to review roadless areas larger than 5000 acres to determine 
their suitability for designation as wilderness.  43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000).  See infra notes 123-26 
(discussing WSAs in Utah). 
 19. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton (SUWA I), 301 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(construing section 603(c) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2000), which requires BLM to 
“continue to manage [WSAs] . . . in  a manner so as not to impair the suitability of such areas for 
preservation as wilderness”).  In addition, the Tenth Circuit interpreted section 302(a) of 
FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2000), which requires BLM to “manage the public lands . . . in 
accordance with the land use plans . . . when they are available.”  SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1233. 
BLM’s regulations prevent the agency from acting in a way that is inconsistent with an area’s 
land management plan.  43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2005) (“All future resource management 
authorizations and actions . . . and subsequent more detailed or specific planning, shall conform 
to the approved plan”). 
 20. See SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1239 (concluding that BLM violated NEPA by failing to 
supplement the EIS on the applicable BLM resource management plan to account for 
substantial increases in ORV use). 
 21. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66. 
 22. Id. at 71. 
 23. Id. at 73.  The Court did note that a supplemental NEPA analysis may be required 
when the agency revises or amends a land use plan.  Id.  Also, the Court stated that plans that 
commit specific areas to ORV use would be reviewable.  Id. at 69 n. 4.  It would also seem that 
plans that authorize activities such as continued grazing levels should be reviewable. 
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environmentalists could not challenge the forest plan for the Wayne 
National Forest because federal land plans are generally not ripe for 
review.24  Both Ohio Forestry and SUWA placed significant 
roadblocks in the path of challenges to planning decisions, virtually 
eliminating the public’s ability to challenge agency land management 
decisions on a programmatic level.  Even more ominously, the two 
decisions have encouraged land management agencies to significantly 
revise their conception of a land management plan, from a vehicle for 
determining which lands are suitable for various activities to 
paperwork that makes no commitments about land suitability and 
sets few, if any, standards governing future activities. 
Responding to the Supreme Court’s two decisions, in 2005 the 
Forest Service issued a new rule significantly amending its forest plan 
rules.25  Citing both Ohio Forestry and SUWA in its preamble, the 
new rule emphasized the “strategic” nature of land management 
plans, which now would authorize no specific projects, merely 
“characteriz[ing]” future conditions and providing “guidance” for 
future decisions.26  Then, in late 2006, the Forest Service delivered the 
coup de grace to the planning process by amending the Forest Service 
Handbook to create a new categorical exclusion (CX) that exempted 
 24. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998).  Ohio Forestry did not 
preclude judicial review of all forest plan terms, however.  The Court noted that claims based on 
a forest plan’s ORV use restrictions, road closures, or trail construction provisions would not 
have been barred.  Id. at 738. However, because the Sierra Club did not raise these arguments 
below, the Court refused to consider them in reaching its decision.  See infra notes 119-21 
(discussing challenges to forest plans not barred by Ohio Forestry). 
 25. See Theo Stein, Forest Management “Streamlined” Bush’s Rules Simplify the Planning 
Process, but Critics Say Timber and Mining Firms Will Benefit, DENVER POST, Dec. 23, 2004, at 
A1 (noting that Bush Administration officials billed the new rule as a means of streamlining the 
planning process by reducing the time the agency would spend revising each forest plan and 
cutting planning costs by nearly a third); see also infra notes 271-93 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Bush Administration’s 2005 planning rule). 
 26. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1025 (Jan. 5, 
2005) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219).  The Forest Service promulgated the 2005 planning 
rule without seeking advice from a Committee of Scientists, a group of independent experts that 
Congress required the Forest Service to assemble in NFMA to advise the agency in developing 
land plan regulations.  See George Hoberg, Science, Politics, and U.S. Forest Service Law: The 
Battle over the Forest Service Planning Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 21–22 (2004) (noting that 
Democratic members of Congress, critical of the proposed planning rule, “chastised” the Bush 
Administration for making decisions without consulting a committee of scientists, a departure 
from “a long pattern of employing scientific advisers to help resolve difficult forest policy 
conflicts”).  NFMA requires that the Secretary of Agriculture, before promulgating regulations 
governing land planning, to “appoint a committee of scientists who are not officers or 
employees of the Forest Service.  The committee shall provide scientific and technical advice 
and counsel on proposed guidelines and procedures to assure that an effective interdisciplinary 
approach is proposed and adopted.”  16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2000). 
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forest plans, plan amendments, and plan revisions under the 2005 
planning rule from NEPA documentation.27  The agency again cited 
both SUWA and Ohio Forestry in its preamble to support its 
characterization of land plans as merely “strategic and aspirational,” 
and thus without any direct environmental effects.28 
This article analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in SUWA in 
the context of these recent rollbacks in federal land planning.  Section 
I begins with a discussion of the congressional intent in making land 
planning a focal point of both NFMA and FLPMA and proceeds to 
discuss the federal government’s considerable investments in public 
land planning over the last thirty years.  Section II analyzes the 
Court’s decision in SUWA.  Section III explains how lower courts 
have interpreted SUWA to limit opportunities for the public to hold 
agencies accountable for their planning decisions.  Section IV 
discusses recent agency policies reflecting an understanding that, 
under SUWA and Ohio Forestry, federal land use plans are 
unenforceable, aspirational documents, and abandoning the notion of 
planning as an informed, public process that Congress intended to 
govern public lands management.  Section IV posits that this 
redefinition of planning suggests a reemergence of a focus on 
commodity production that originally led Congress to require 
agencies to open up their decision-making procedures through the 
land planning process. This article concludes that in light of the 
immense resources that have been devoted to public land planning, 
the benefits derived from widespread public participation, and the 
congressional intent to make planning the focus of both FLPMA and 
NFMA, Congress should respond to the Ohio Forestry and SUWA 
decisions by reinvigorating federal land planning and making federal 
land management agencies publicly accountable for their planning 
decisions. 
 27. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, 
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481 (Dec. 15, 
2006).  This CX (see above) was just the latest in a series of congressional and administrative 
actions aimed at “streamlining” the NEPA process by exempting a wide range of activities from 
environmental review.  See ROBERT G. DREHER, NEPA UNDER SIEGE: THE POLITICAL 
ASSAULT ON THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 7-10, Georgetown Envtl. L. & 
Pol’y Inst. 2005 (describing how expanded use of CXs, restrictions on the substance of 
environmental review, and restrictions on public participation and judicial review have been 
used in recent years to weaken NEPA); see also Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 352–55 (2004) (discussing the Bush Administration task force formed 
to reform NEPA that recommended expanding the use of CXs). 
 28. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, 
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,483. 
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I.  BACKGROUND: RESOURCE PLANNING ON THE PUBLIC LANDS 
Although the Forest Service engaged in some form of planning in 
its early days under Gifford Pinchot’s direction, congressionally-
mandated, forest-wide planning did not begin until the 1970s.29  
NFMA changed national forest management, as well as the 
relationship between Congress and the Forest Service, by imposing 
substantive planning procedures that required public participation, 
and by holding the Forest Service accountable for its management 
decisions by subjecting them to judicial review.30  Congress also made 
planning and public involvement centerpieces of BLM land 
management in FLPMA.31  By requiring public participation in 
planning decisions, both NFMA and FLPMA created processes that 
involved the public early in the land management process, before 
BLM and the Forest Service could commit to a specific course of 
action.  Once an agency has chosen a specific course of action, it 
becomes a project proponent, and the public’s influence diminishes.  
But the price of such open-minded land planning was not cheap—
both BLM and the Forest Service spend millions of dollars 
developing each federal land plan.32 
A. National Forest Planning 
The Forest Service is responsible for managing more than 191 
million acres of land, including 155 national forests, 20 national 
grasslands, and eight land utilization projects.33  In the Organic Act of 
 29. Congress passed NFMA, which required forest-wide planning, in 1976.  See supra note 
2 and accompanying text (discussing the passage of NFMA and FLPMA). 
 30. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 72 (noting that before Congress exerted 
control over forest management in the 1970s, “Forest Service decisions were considered 
protected by an aura of virtual unreviewability”).  As an example, Wilkinson and Anderson 
claimed that they were not able to uncover any evidence of a Forest Service activity being 
restrained by an injunction before 1970.  Id.  The authors cite Parker v. United States, 309 F. 
Supp. 593, 601 (D. Colo. 1970), aff’d 448 F. 2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971) (enjoining the Forest Service 
from completing a timber sale in a potential wilderness area in the White River National Forest 
until the President made a final decision on the area’s wilderness designation), as the first case 
producing an injunction. 
 31. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(2) (2000) (stating it is in the “national interest” for public lands 
to be managed “through a land use planning process”); § 1701(a)(5) (requiring public 
participation in developing regulations governing public land decision making); see also 
Coggins, supra note 5, at 10-11 (noting that congressional policies in FLPMA include the intent 
that “[i]nventorying and planning should become the central focus of rangeland management,” 
as well as the intent to increase public involvement in BLM decision making). 
 32. See infra notes 79-96 and accompanying text (discussing the federal investment in land 
planning). 
 33. Office of the Fed. Reg., U. S. Government Manual 118 (2006–07). 
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1897 (Organic Act), Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture to 
manage the lands that would later become the national forest system 
to “regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests 
thereon from destruction.”34  Federal forest planning began under 
Gifford Pinchot, who in 1898 ushered in plans for managing timber 
lands for both harvest and forest preservation as the head of the 
Department of Agriculture’s Division of Forestry, some seven years 
before authority to manage federal national forest lands would be 
officially transferred to the Agriculture Department.35  The Organic 
Act gave the Forest Service broad authority by supplying only vague 
directives for managing national forest land.36  Land planning would 
remain an agency-driven process until the 1970s. 
Congressional involvement in Forest Service planning began 
with the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (MUSYA) of 1960.37  In 
MUSYA, Congress expanded the purposes the Forest Service must 
consider in managing forests beyond the watershed and timber uses 
established in the Organic Act38 to include recreation, range, wildlife, 
and fish.39  The Forest Service implemented MUSYA’s requirement 
that the agency give “due consideration” in its management decisions 
to the “relative values” of an area’s resources through planning.40  
During the next decade, Forest Service planning for wilderness areas 
began under the Wilderness Act of 1964,41 and the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 196942, which added a critical 
 34. 16 U.S.C. § 551 (2000). 
 35. The Department of Interior General Land Office managed the nation’s forest reserves 
until 1905, when Congress transferred authority to manage the reserves to the Department of 
Agriculture Division of Forestry, which soon thereafter became the Forest Service.  See id. § 472 
(transferring forest management authority to the Secretary of Agriculture).  Congress 
designated the forest reserves as national forests in 1907, ten years after passing the Organic 
Act.  See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 19 (discussing the beginnings of national 
forest planning). 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 551. 
 37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31. 
 38. See id. § 475 (declaring the purposes for establishing the national forests to be “to 
improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable 
conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber”). 
 39. Id. § 528. 
 40. Id. § 529.  Under the MUSYA, the Forest Service began to use planning for resource 
functions, such as wildlife and recreation, and it began to use zoning to designate areas 
appropriate for particular uses.  See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 30–31 
(describing the dual planning processes that the Forest Service developed in response to the 
MUSYA as the “parents of the integrated land and resource planning” in NFMA). 
 41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000). 
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component by requiring public involvement.43  Congress became 
more actively involved in Forest Service planning with the enactment 
of the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 
1974 (RPA),44 which required the Forest Service to meet national 
goals for forest resource allocation and compile periodic assessments 
of the nation’s forest resources.45  Drafted during the Nixon 
Administration by a Congress aiming to limit that administration’s 
efforts to regionalize Forest Service administration while increasing 
congressional control over national forest management decisions,46 
the RPA added “top-down” planning by imposing national planning 
requirements on the Forest Service to supplement the forest-level 
planning the agency hist
The RPA produced no immediate changes in the Forest Service’s 
management practices, which, during the 1960s and 1970s, included 
increased timber sales and clearcutting.48  But the year after Congress 
passed the RPA, the Fourth Circuit affirmed an injunction against 
clearcutting in the Monongahela National Forest, ruling that the 
clearcuts (“even-aged timber harvests”) violated the terms of the 
Organic Act, which required timber on national forest land to be 
“marked and designated” prior to sale.49  Congress responded to the 
 43. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 32-33 (discussing how the Wilderness 
Act brought about a Forest Service decision to inventory roadless areas, and how, in addition to 
increasing public participation in Forest Service decision making, NEPA required the agency to 
analyze environmental effects of mining on its lands and prompted it to develop detailed 
resource inventories). 
 44. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA), Pub. L. 93-
378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1610 (2000)).  The RPA was among 
the first bills President Ford signed into law, just over a week after President Nixon resigned on 
Aug. 9, 1974.  LE MASTER, supra note 3, at 49. 
 45. TRASK & FAIRFAX, supra note 10, at 324–25.  The RPA grew out of timber industry 
efforts in the late 1960s to promote legislation which would increase Forest Service funding to 
allow for more intensive management of high-quality timber sites and require the Forest Service 
to engage in national-level resource planning.  When Congress finally passed the RPA, it was a 
resource planning and policy statute that some environmentalists also supported.  Id. 
 46. LE MASTER, supra note 3, at 37. 
 47. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 77.  The RPA required the Forest Service 
to prepare an assessment describing the renewable resources on its lands every ten years, a 
programmatic proposal of long-range objectives for the agency every five years, and an annual 
report comparing the agency’s activities to its proposed objectives.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1601(a), 1602, 
1606(d) (2000). 
 48. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 41 (discussing how the Forest Service’s 
increase in timber sales and clearcutting prompted widespread criticism during the early 1970s). 
 49. W. Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 422, 433 
(N.D. W. Va. 1973), aff’d 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975) (interpreting 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed 
1976)). 
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Monongahela decision the following year by enacting the National 
Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976, reforming Forest Service 
timber management policies50 and repealing the provision in the 
Organic Act that required trees to be marked prior to sale.51 
Although controversy over clearcutting and the Monongahela 
decision prompted NFMA, that legislation addressed far more than 
just clearcutting.  NFMA comprehensively revised the Forest 
Service’s land management policies and practices, and significantly 
changed the relationship between Congress and the Forest Service by 
imposing substantive planning provisions, restricting discretionary 
authority over timber harvests and requiring public participation in 
Forest Service decision making.52  The Senate Report on NMFA, 
explaining the need for the legislation, quoted President Theodore 
Roosevelt: 
The reward of foresight for this Nation is great and easily foretold.  
But there must be a look ahead, there must be a realization of the 
fact that to waste, to destroy, our natural resources, to skin and 
exhaust land instead of using it so as to increase its usefulness, will 
result in undermining in the days of our children the very 
prosperity which we ought by right to hand down to them amplified 
and developed.53 
Senator Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.), author of the bill which 
eventually became NFMA,54 wanted to ensure that the Forest Service 
would not “turn the national forests into tree production programs 
which override other values.”55  The Senate committee responsible 
for drafting NFMA considered public participation and planning to 
be the cornerstones of the legislation, maintaining “that land 
management planning and the formulation of regulations to govern 
 50. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 72. 
 51. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-588, §13, 90 Stat. 2958 (1976). 
 52. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2000) (public participation); § 1604(f) (required forest plan 
provisions); § 1604(g)(3) (timber harvesting). 
 53. S. REP. NO. 94-893, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6667–68 (1976). 
 54. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra  note 4, at 42.  Two bills to reform national forest 
management were before the Senate to reform national forest management: Senate Bill 2926, S. 
2926, 94th Cong. (1976), proposed by Sen. Randolph (D-W.Va.), established specific timber 
management standards, while Sen. Humphrey’s bill, Senate Bill 3091, S. 3091 94th Cong. (1976), 
amended the Organic Act to allow clearcutting and required the Forest Service to regulate 
timber harvests through forest plans.  See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 42. 
 55. Forest and Rangeland Management: J. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment, 
Soil Conservation, and Forestry of the S. Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry and the Subcomm. 
on the Environment and Land Resources of the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th 
Cong. 262 (1976) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey, Chairman, S. Comm. on Agriculture 
and Forestry). 
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the planning process shall be accomplished with improved 
opportunity for public participation at all levels.”56  By requiring 
public and scientific involvement in forest planning, NFMA changed 
the Forest Service’s decision-making process and opened the agency’s 
decisions to public accountability and judicial scrutiny.57  Congress 
designed the planning process to recalibrate the weight the Forest 
Service gave to commodity user interests by involving the public at an 
early point in the Forest Service’s land management decisions.58 
NFMA amended the RPA by directing the Secretary of 
Agriculture to develop land and resource management plans, 
consistent with MUYSA,59 for each unit of the national forest 
system.60  In addition, NFMA required the Forest Service to 
promulgate regulations to govern land plans according to the criteria 
Congress specified in the statute.61  Among the latter was a directive 
that the agency assemble a committee of scientists to supply scientific 
and technical advice to the agency concerning its planning 
regulations.62  Other NFMA provisions restricted timber harvesting,63 
directed the Forest Service to adopt procedures to ensure preparation 
of forest plans consistent with NEPA,64 and required consistency of 
all contracts and use permits with forest land management plans.
B. BLM Land Planning 
Congress created the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in 
1946 out of the ashes of the General Land Office (established in 1812) 
and the Grazing Service (established in 1934).66  BLM now manages 
 56. S. REP. NO. 94-893, at 34 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6693. 
 57. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 72. 
 58. See id. at 69-72 (discussing how congressional concerns regarding an overemphasis on 
timber production instead of over other uses influenced NFMA’s planning provisions). 
 59. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2000). 
 60. Id. §§ 528-531. 
 61. Id. § 1604(g).  For example, NFMA restricted timber harvesting, required the Forest 
Service to adopt procedures for ensuring that forest plans were prepared consistent with NEPA, 
required the Forest Service to take inventory of resources, and required that all contracts and 
permits allowing use of a national forest conform to the forest’s land management plan.  Id. §§ 
1604(g), (i). 
 62. Id. §1604(h)(1). 
 63. Id. §1604(g)(3). 
 64. Id. §1604(g)(1). 
 65. Id. §1604(i). 
 66. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1946, 11 Fed. Reg. 7876 (July 20, 1946).  See Al Pierson, 
The Bureau of Land Management: A Half-Century of Challenges and Change, 32 LAND & 
WATER L. REV. 345, 345 (1997) (discussing the controversy over raising grazing fees from a 
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262 million acres of land, almost all located in the West.67  Formal 
BLM planning began in the wake of the 1964 Classification and 
Multiple Use Act, which required preparation of what were called 
“management framework plans” (MFPs).68  NEPA, signed into law 
on the first day of 1970, imposed new planning obligations on the 
agency,69 especially after a D.C. federal district court ruled that the 
agency could not meet its obligations under NEPA by preparing a 
single EIS for its entire grazing program but instead had to prepare 
EISs on all proposed plans that could produce significant 
environmental effects.70  But BLM prepared no systematic, detailed 
land plans until after 1976, when Congress passed FLPMA, requiring 
preparation of resource management plans (RMPs) with extensive 
requirements for public participation.71 
Congress designed planning as the centerpiece of BLM land 
management.72  FLPMA required BLM’s RMPs to meet nine criteria, 
the majority of which were quite vague, allowing BLM a great deal of 
nickel to fifteen cents per animal unit month that led to the decision to merge the Grazing 
Service with the General Land Office to create the BLM). 
 67. U.S. Government Manual, supra note 33, at 251. 
 68. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 1970); see Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use 
Planning, supra note 6, at 307 (discussing the origins of formal land use planning on the federal 
lands). 
 69. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852.  For a more detailed discussion of early BLM planning, see 
Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 317-19. 
 70. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D. D.C. 1974), aff’d per curiam, 
527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976). 
 71. More than a decade after FLPMA’s planning requirements came into force, 
commentators lamented the “inconsistent and difficult” planning efforts undertaken by BLM, 
which resulted in resource management plans being prepared for just 12 out of 162 planning 
areas by 1987, even under the “drastically revised” planning regulations devised to streamline 
planning by limiting public participation promulgated under Interior Secretary Watt.  Coggins, 
The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 318.  For a discussion of the 
Department of Interior policies under Secretary Watt, see George Cameron Coggins & Doris 
K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside Remains”: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as Secretary 
of Interior on Federal Land Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 489 (1990) 
(chronicling Secretary Watt’s attempts to “change the way Interior conducted its business”). 
 72. Coggins, supra note 5, at 15.  The House Report on FLPMA stated that by legislating 
formalized policies for managing the public lands, the “proper multiple use mix of retained 
public lands is to be achieved by comprehensive land use planning, coordinated with State and 
local planning.  Planning decisions are to be made only after full opportunity for public 
involvement in the planning process.  Management and disposal of the public lands are to be 
consistent with land use plans so developed.”  H. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 2 (1976), as reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6176.  Like the Forest Service under NFMA, BLM was to “treat land 
use planning as dynamic and subject to change with changing conditions and values.”  Id. at 
6179.  Further, the House intended the public participation requirements in FLPMA would not 
diminish BLM’s authority and responsibilities to manage the public lands, but instead to 
“provide means for input by the interested public before decisions are made.”  Id. at 6181. 
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discretion.73  Planning was a central focus of FLPMA, a statute in 
which Congress declared it was national policy to retain federal 
ownership of public lands and requiring any disposition of federal 
land to be “a result of the land use planning procedure[s].”74  FLPMA 
also directed BLM to manage lands “in accordance with” land use 
plans.75  BLM regulations require the “future management 
authorizations and actions [to] . . .  conform to the approved plan.”76  
Congress’s integrated planning was also folded into a number of 
FLPMA’s substantive provisions regarding land acquisition, disposal, 
and conveyance.77  FLPMA also required public participation to be a 
central element of the FLPMA land planning process.78 
 73. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 321-23.  
According to 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2000), the land use plans must 
1) use and observe the principle of multiple use and sustained yield . . . 2) use a 
systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, 
biological, economic, and other sciences; 3) give priority to the designation and 
protection of areas of critical environmental concern; 4) rely, the to extend it is 
available, on the inventory of the public lands, their resources, and other values; 5) 
consider present and potential uses of the public lands; 6) consider the relative scarcity 
of the values involved and the availability of alternative means . . . ; 7) weigh long-term 
benefits to the public against short-term benefits; 8) provide for compliance with 
applicable pollution control laws . . . ; and 9) to the extent consistent with the laws 
governing the administration of the public lands, coordinate the land use inventory, 
planning, and management activities . . . with the land use planning . . . of other 
[federal, state, and local agencies] . . . . 
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c) (2000).  See also Bureau of Land Management, Land Use Planning 
Handbook 1 (Mar. 11, 2005) (establishing policies and guidance for BLM land use planning 
under FLPMA). 
 74. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (2000).  The statute also called for creating inventories of 
resources on public lands such that “their present and future use is projected through a land use 
planning process” and for setting “goals and objectives [to] be established by law as guidelines 
for public land use planning.”  Id. §§ 1701(a)(2), (7).  BLM is to rely on these inventories in the 
planning process “to the extent [an inventory] is available.”  Id. § 1712(c)(4). 
 75. Id. § 1732(a).  FLPMA made an exception to the requirement that BLM manage lands 
consistent with the land plan, when available, “where a tract of such public land has been 
dedicated to specific uses according to any other provisions of law,” in which case it “shall be 
managed in accordance with such law.”  Id. 
 76. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2006). 
 77. Coggins, The Developing Law of Land Use Planning, supra note 6, at 323-25.  FLPMA 
requires that land sales, acquisitions, and conveyances by states must be consistent with land use 
plans.  43 U.S.C.  §§ 1713(a), 1715(b), 1721(c)(1) (2000).  Additional FLPMA provisions 
required planning in BLM wilderness designation and in managing individual grazing permits.  
Id. §§ 1782, 1752(d). 
 78. FLPMA directs BLM to “allow an opportunity for public involvement and by 
regulation shall establish procedures . . . to comment upon and participate in the formulation of 
plans and programs relating to the management of the public lands.  43 U.S.C. § 1712(f).  
Section 103(d) of FLPMA defines “public involvement” as “the opportunity for participation by 
affected citizens in rule making, decision making, and planning with respect to the public lands.”  
Id. § 1702(d). 
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C. Federal Investment in Land Planning 
Congress and federal land management agencies have made a 
multi-million dollar investment in land use planning since the late 
1970s.  When the Forest Service began to develop forest plans under 
NFMA, the agency estimated that each plan would cost around $1 
million79 — roughly $3.6 million in 2007 dollars when adjusted for 
inflation.80  By the mid-1980s, however, actual planning costs climbed 
to more than $3 million per plan—or $5.76 million in 2007 dollars—
and land planning consumed approximately ten percent of the budget 
of many national forests.81  One estimate had the Forest Service 
spending $300 million on plan development to meet NFMA’s goal of 
completing plans for every national forest by 1985.82  The Forest 
Service now predicts that plans developed under its 2005 planning 
rule each will carry a price tag of about $9 million.83  Even monitoring 
and evaluation requirements in forest plans are costly, with the Forest 
Service estimating that these costs under the new planning rule will 
total around $45 million, or about $360,000 per plan.84 
 79. RANDAL O’TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE 176 (1988). 
 80. Dollar values have been adjusted for inflation to reflect 2007 values using the U.S. 
Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator based on the Consumer 
Price Index.  The inflation calculator is available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited Sept. 21, 
2007). 
 81. O’TOOLE, supra note 79, at 176. 
 82. Id.  The $300 million figure was based on the 123 plans slated for completion by 1985, 
estimating a $2 million per-plan cost for each of the sixty-plus plans that were not complete by 
the deadline.  Id. at 24.  Adjusted for inflation, this figure would amount to $576 million in 2007 
dollars.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(c) (2000) (requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to “attempt” to 
incorporate NFMA standards and guidelines into land plans for all units of the national forests 
by Sept. 30, 1985).  Other estimates of planning costs have been much lower, with one 
suggesting that the Forest Service had spent just $250 million on planning by 1996.  Steven 
Quarles, The Problem with Planning, in THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY 135 (1998).  Mr. Quarles presented the oral arguments to the Supreme 
Court for the intervening industry groups in Ohio Forestry.  U.S. Supreme Court Media, Ohio 
Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1997/1997_97_16/ (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
 83. U.S. FOREST SERVICE & BUSINESS GENETICS, A BUSINESS EVALUATION OF THE 2000 
AND PROPOSED NFMA PLANNING RULES 25 (2002).  In comparison, the report estimated that 
plan revisions developed under the 2000 planning rule would have cost $12.9 million.  Id.  See 
also Robert Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in 
Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1189-90 (2005) (discussing cost and procedural hurdles in 
federal land planning).  Some estimates have placed recent planning costs slightly lower, at $5 to 
$7 million per plan.  See In One of His Last Acts, Bosworth Defends Planning Rule, PUBLIC 
LAND NEWS, Jan. 19, 2005, at 5. 
 84. USDA Forest Service, Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Final Rule (36 CFR 219) for 
National Forest Land Management Planning 22 (2005), http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/ 
includes/cba2.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
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By 1995, the Forest Service had prepared forest plans for all of 
the 155 national forests under its management.85  Because forest plans 
must be revised and reissued at least every fifteen years,86 most forest 
plans are in their second generation.87  In 2005, the Forest Service 
claimed that it had prepared 150 forest plans and plan revisions,88 and 
the agency anticipated completing another 100 forest plans and plan 
revisions during the ensuing decade.89  Using a conservative estimate 
of an adjusted $5.8 million cost per plan, the Forest Service has 
already spent $870 million on planning alone.  Budget appropriations 
for Forest Service land management planning have seen a slight, but 
steady, decline during the Bush Administration, with the 2008 budget 
proposal requesting $52.6 million for land management planning, 
along with an additional $166.2 million for monitoring and evaluation 
in the national forest system.90  Yet land management planning 
 85. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 60 Fed. Reg. 18,886 
(Apr. 13, 1995).  At the time the Forest Service issued the 1995 Federal Register notice, forest 
plans had been developed for all but four national forests: the Klamath, Six Rivers, Mendocino, 
and Shasta-Trinity National Forests.  Id.  Forest plans for these forests, all located in Northern 
California, were approved by the end of 1995.  USDA Forest Service, Land and Resource 
Management Plan, Klamath National Forest, 1995; Shasta-Trinity National Forest, Land and 
Resource Management Plan, 1995; Mendocino National Forest, Forest Management Plan, 1995; 
Six Rivers National Forest LRMP, 1995. 
 86. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(f)(5) (2000). 
 87. See USDA Forest Service, Schedule of Forest Service Land Management Plan 
Revisions & New Plans, Apr. 2, 2007, http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/nfma/includes/LRMP 
schedule.pdf (last visited September 21, 2007) (listing land management plans that have been 
revised, are in the process of revision, or are in need of revision). 
 88. See National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023, 1024 (Jan. 
5, 2005) (stating that the Forest Service has prepared 150 forest plans and plan revisions).  
Although the Forest Service has prepared a plan for each of the national forests and grasslands 
that it manages, the agency has issued a single plan covering multiple areas in some instances.  
This practice appears to be most prevalent in plans for forests and grasslands in the Southern 
(Region 8) and Rocky Mountain (Region 2) regions.  In Region 2, for example, one plan 
includes the Arapaho and Roosevelt National Forests, along with the Pawnee National 
Grassland, and another single plan covers the Kiowa, Rita Blanca, Black Kettle, and McClellan 
Creek National Grasslands.  USDA Forest Service, Arapaho & Roosevelt National Forests, 
Pawnee National Grassland, http://www.fs.fed.us/r2/arnf/projects/ (last visited May 16, 2007); 
Cibola National Forest, Projects & Plans, http://www.fs.fed.us/r3/cibola/projects/index.shtml 
(last visited May 16, 2007).  In Region 8, some plans combine individual forests, while other 
plans include all the national forest land in a particular state.  USDA Forest Service, Forest 
Planning in the Southern Region, http://www.fs.fed.us/r8/planning/status_of_plans.shtml (last 
visited May 16, 2007). 
 89. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1024. 
 90. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 
2008, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET OVERVIEW D-2 (2007) [hereinafter FOREST SERVICE FY2008 
BUDGET], available at http://www.fs.fed.us/publications/budget-2008/fy2008-forest-service-
budget-overview.pdf.  These figures show a slight decline from 2006, when the Forest Service 
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consumes only a small fraction of the Forest Service’s $4.6 billion 
2008 budget, just over one percent of the agency’s annual budget.91 
Funding for BLM land planning also has been in decline under 
the Bush Administration, dropping from a budgeted $50 million in 
2006 to a projected budget of $47 million for the fiscal year 2008.92  
Because BLM’s annual budget, at $1.85 billion for 2008,93 is less than 
half of that of the Forest Service, planning encompasses a slightly 
larger proportion of the agency’s annual budget, at roughly 2.5 
percent.  BLM RMPs have averaged three to four years to complete, 
at an approximate cost of $2.5 million to $4 million per plan.94  
Assuming an adjusted $3 million per plan, BLM has spent 
approximately $486 million on planning to date. 
In 2001, BLM launched an effort to update all of its 162 land 
plans within a decade.95  If it completes all these revisions, BLM will 
spend at least another $512 million on land planning by 2011.96  
Together, then, BLM and the Forest Service have since the mid- 
1970’s invested more than $1 billion in developing land management 
plans and currently spend more than $100 million combined annually 
on plan revisions. 
received $57.7 for land management planning and $166.2 million for monitoring and evaluation.  
Id.  By comparison, in 2002, the Forest Service appropriated $70.358 million for land 
management planning; in 2003, the figure climbed to $72.158 million, but dropped back down to 
$70.868 million for 2004.  UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST SERVICE, 
FISCAL YEAR 2004, BUDGET JUSTIFICATION I-20, available at http://www.taxpayer.net/ 
forest/USFSFY04BudgetJustification.pdf. 
 91. FOREST SERVICE FY2008 BUDGET, at D-5.  In comparison, Forest Service spending on 
wildland fire management has increased from 13% of the agency’s annual budget in 1991 to 
45% of the 2008 budget.  Id.  at 3. 
 92. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, DETAILED INFORMATION ON THE BUREAU OF 
LAND MANAGEMENT – LAND USE PLANNING ASSESSMENT, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ 
expectmore/detail/10003707.2005.html. 
 93. See Forest Service Gets Little Public Help in Money Bill Run-Up, PUBLIC LAND NEWS, 
May 4, 2007, at 3 (noting that dozens of witnesses voiced their support of BLM programs before 
the U.S.  House subcommittee on Interior appropriations).  Like the Forest Service, BLM also 
must devote a large chunk of its annual budget to wildland fire management, with the $801.8 
million marked for fire suppression encompassing 43% of BLM’s 2008 budget.  See Press 
Release, U.S. Department of Interior, President’s Budget Will Improve National Parks, 
Working Landscapes, Indian Education and Safety (Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.doi.gov/ 
news/07_News_Releases/070205b.html. 
 94. See Forest Service Gets Little Public Help in Money Bill Run-Up, PUBLIC LAND 
NEWS, May 4, 2007, at 3. 
 95. U.S. Dept. of Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Land Use Planning, 
http://www.blm.gov/planning/policy.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 96. This figure is based on an estimated cost of $3.2 million for each of the 162 BLM land 
plans. 
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II.  NORTON V. SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS  
ALLIANCE: UNDERMINING FEDERAL LAND PLANNING 
In 2004, in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
(SUWA),97 the Supreme Court placed a substantial roadblock in the 
way of members of the public seeking judicial review of federal land 
use plans.  A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 
reversed the Tenth Circuit and rejected environmental claims, ruling 
that commitments BLM made in its land use plans were not generally 
enforceable.98  The SUWA decision rested on the Court’s conclusion 
that the Administrative Procedure Act’s promise to compel agency 
action extended only to “discrete” agency actions,99 consistent with 
Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy of protecting the Executive from 
public challenges through citizen suits.100  Scalia’s reluctance to 
recognize citizens’ standing to challenge public land management 
decisions was evident in his 1990 opinion for the Court in Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation, where he concluded that 
environmentalists lacked standing to bring a programmatic challenge 
against a series of BLM actions in a single lawsuit.101  Eight years after 
Lujan, in Ohio Forestry v. Sierra Club, the Court decided that forest 
plans were not usually ripe for judicial review outside the context of a 
site-specific action.102  Considered together, Lujan, Ohio Forestry, and 
 97. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004). 
 98. See infra notes 144-67, and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s reasoning in 
SUWA). 
 99. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72. 
 100. See Brett Birdsong, Justice Scalia’s Footprints on the Public Lands, 83 DEN. U. L. REV. 
259, 285 (2005) (arguing that “by relying on the traditional elements of mandamus as a limit to 
the right to judicial review of agency nonfeasance under the APA,” Justice Scalia has advanced 
his agenda of protecting the executive branch from judicial oversight).  Other commentators 
have found Scalia’s reasoning to be suspect.  See, e.g., William D. Araiza, In Praise of a Skeletal 
APA: Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Judicial Remedies for Agency Inaction, and 
the Questionable Value of Amending the APA, 56 ADMIN. L. J. 979, 985 (2004) (describing the 
Court’s restriction of the APA provision allowing agency inaction to be reviewable to be limited 
to “discrete” actions to be “remarkably weak,” in light of the APA’s overarching policies and 
purposes aimed at maximizing opportunities “to seek meaningful judicial review consistent with 
a respect for the discretion retained by the agency”); Justin C. Konrad, Comment, The 
Shrinking Scope of Judicial Review in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 77 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 515, 534 (2006) (arguing that the FLPMA’s non-impairment mandate satisfied 
the Lujan requirements for “agency action” relied on in the Court’s SUWA  opinion); Noah 
Perch-Ahern, Comment, Broad Programmatic Attacks: SUWA, the Lower Courts’ Responses, 
and the Law of Agency Inaction, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 411, 422-29 (2005) (discussing early 
responses to SUWA in the lower courts). 
 101. 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990). 
 102. 523 U.S. 726, 732 (1998).  See infra notes 110-18, and accompanying text (discussing the 
Court’s Ohio Forestry decision). 
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SUWA placed serious constraints on the public’s ability to seek 
judicial review of BLM and Forest Service land use planning 
decisions. 
A. SUWA’s Predecessors: Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation and 
Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club 
Justice Scalia began to lay the groundwork for the Court’s 
SUWA decision with his 1990 opinion in Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, which restricted citizen suit standing in public land 
cases.103  In Lujan, environmentalists challenged a series of BLM 
decisions to reclassify land withdrawals under FLPMA (these 
reclassifications opened up previously withdrawn lands to potential 
mineral development).  The environmentalists claimed that this “land 
withdrawal review program” violated FLPMA, NEPA, and the 
APA.104  Although the district court held that the environmentalists 
lacked standing because they failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact,105 
the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the record was “more than 
adequate” to establish standing.106  But the Supreme Court reversed, 
ruling that the environmentalists lacked standing to challenge BLM’s 
“land withdrawal review program” because, according to the agency, 
there was in fact no such program.107  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court emphasized separation of powers concerns: to allow judicial 
intervention in executive decision making on the programmatic level 
would, he maintained, exceed the “traditional” role of the courts.108  
 103. 497 U.S. 871 (1990); see Brett Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and 
Administrative Responsibility for Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 
523, 575-78 (2005) (discussing Justice Scalia’s approach to interpreting when an agency 
regulation is retroactive based on whether the conduct occurs before the regulation’s adoption). 
 104. 497 U.S. at 877.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (2000) (authorizing BLM to make or modify land 
withdrawals).  Id. § 1712(d) (authorizing BLM to review land classifications as part of the land 
use planning process). 
 105. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D. D.C. 1988). 
 106. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 878 F. 2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  The D.C. Circuit 
had earlier concluded the environmentalists had standing in this suit when it upheld a 
preliminary injunction issued by the district court preventing BLM from making any new 
withdrawal revocations or classification terminations.  835 F.2d 305, 314 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh’g 
denied, 844 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 107. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 890. 
 108. Id. at 894.  Scalia wrote that “[e]xcept where Congress explicitly provides for [the 
Court’s] correction of the administrative process at a higher level of generality, we intervene in 
the administration of the laws only when, and to the extent that, a specific ‘final agency action’ 
has an actual or immediately threatened effect.”  Id.  See also Birdsong, supra note 100, at 278 
(discussing Scalia’s Lujan concerns over programmatic judicial review of executive agency 
decisions). 
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Thus, the Court rejected the environmentalists’ programmatic 
challenge, leaving the environmentalists with the burden of 
challenging each individual revocation of land withdrawal.109 
Eight years later, in Ohio Forestry Association, Inc. v. Sierra Club 
(1998), a unanimous Court held that an environmental challenge to 
timber cutting goals in a national forest plan was not ripe for judicial 
review.110  The Sierra Club had challenged the Wayne National Forest 
Plan for allowing excessive logging in general, and excessive 
clearcutting in particular.111  The district court ruled in favor of the 
Forest Service on the merits.112  But after deciding that the 
environmentalists’ claims were ripe, the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
district court because it concluded that the Forest Service violated 
NFMA by favoring clearcutting in its forest plan.113 
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the environmental claims were not ripe 
because forest plans “do not command anyone to do anything or to 
refrain from doing anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify 
 109. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 894.  After Lujan, a split developed in the appellate courts over 
whether land use plans were reviewable by the courts.  While both the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits held that suits challenging land use plans were ripe, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits 
rejected claims challenging land use plans on grounds that the challenges were not ripe outside 
the context of site-specific actions.  See Wilderness Soc’y v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 
1996) (interpreting Lujan to indicate that a challenge to the forest plan for the Cherokee 
National Forest was not ripe); Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 613-14 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding 
that a forest plan was ripe for review and distinguishing Lujan); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 
F.3d 753, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that environmentalists lacked standing to challenge 
the forest plan for the Ouachita National Forest absent a site-specific action, analogizing 
challenging a forest plan to the type of programmatic challenge the Court rejected in Lujan); 
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1517-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing 
Lujan and holding that environmentalists had standing to challenge the forest plan for the Idaho 
Panhandle National Forest).  See also Trent Baker, Judicial Enforcement of Forest Plans in the 
Wake of Ohio Forestry, 21 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 81, 86 (2000) (discussing the split 
that developed in the circuits following Lujan that led up to the Court’s Ohio Forestry decision). 
 110. 523 U.S. 726, 739 (1998). 
 111. Id. at 728-29.  The land plan for the Wayne National Forest allowed logging to take 
place on 126,000 acres of the 178,000 acre forest, with a projected timber harvest of 8000 acres, 
5000 acres of which were to be clear-cut.  Id. (citing USDA Forest Service, Land and Resource 
Management Plan, Wayne National Forest A-13 to A-17 (1987)). 
 112. See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 503 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (concluding that 
the Forest Service had fulfilled its statutory planning requirements under NFMA in adopting 
the forest plan). 
 113. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 250-51 (6th Cir. 1997).  The Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the Forest Service failed to comply with NFMA’s restrictions on clearcutting 
because the planning process favored clearcutting and prioritized timber interests over 
recreation and other uses of the forest, rejecting a Forest Service argument that clearcutting 
would “provide new opportunities for recreation.”  Id. 
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any formal legal license, power, or authority; they do not subject 
anyone to any civil criminal liability; they create no legal rights or 
obligations.”114  The Forest Service had argued that the forest plan’s 
clearcutting provision functioned only as guidance without making a 
binding commitment; therefore, a challenge could be ripe only in the 
context of a site-specific action because the plan provision had no on-
the-ground effect.115  Justice Breyer adopted the government’s 
argument in his opinion, characterizing forest plans as mere “tools for 
agency planning and management” and concluding that a challenge to 
a plan’s terms was not ripe for judicial review until brought in the 
context of a site-specific action.116  The environmentalists did achieve 
a small victory when the Court held that if a plan made a commitment 
to a particular resource, such as authorizing ORV use, that issue 
would be ripe.117  Moreover, the Court ruled that the question of 
whether the Forest Service complied with NEPA was also ripe at the 
time the Forest Service approves a land plan.118 
After Ohio Forestry, challenges to plans alleging procedural 
harm,119 as well as claims that a plan’s provisions would result in 
 114. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733.  Justice Breyer noted that he was paraphrasing United 
States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co.,  273 U.S. 299, 309-10 (1927), where a railroad 
challenged a “final report” on the value of its properties that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission prepared under what the Court referred to as the “Valuation Act,” actually a series 
of amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, requiring the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to investigate and make findings regarding the value of railroad 
properties.  Id. at 307. 
 115. Brief for the Federal Respondents at 32-33, Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. 726 (No. 97-16). 
 116. Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737. 
 117. Id. at 738-39.  See infra notes 120-121 (discussing challenges to land use plans not 
barred by ripeness concerns after Ohio Forestry).  This result would also seem to apply to a 
plan’s approval of a continuation of authorized grazing levels. 
 118. A NEPA challenge to a land plan would be ripe because NEPA “simply guarantees a 
particular procedure, not a particular result.”  Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 737.  Therefore, a 
claim alleging procedural injury arising from an agency’s failure to comply with NEPA in 
developing a land plan would be ripe.  Justice Breyer further noted that had the Sierra Club 
raised the claims that the forest plan’s approval of ORV use, or its failure to close roads or 
provide for additional trails, in its complaint “the ripeness analysis in this case with respect to 
those provisions of the Plan that produce the harm would be significantly different.”  Id. at 738. 
 119. “[P]rocedural harm” results when the injury arises from an agency’s failure to follow 
statutorily required procedures, such as violating NEPA.  See Baker, supra note 109, at 105-06 
(concluding that although Ohio Forestry recognized that claims of NEPA violations in the 
preparation of forest plans, plaintiffs may also be able to show procedural harm under NFMA, 
FLPMA, or the ESA); see also Barton J. Birch, Comment: Ohio Forestry and What It Means for 
the Future, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 141, 162-66 (2000) (discussing lower courts’ upholding challenges 
to land use plans as ripe in limited situations after Ohio Forestry, but concluding that challenges 
to substantive plan provisions outside the context of a site-specific action were not ripe). 
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immediate on-the-ground harm, such as authorization of ORV use,120 
could avoid dismissal on ripeness grounds.121  But substantive 
challenges to land plans outside the context of a site-specific action 
were no longer ripe, requiring members of  the public who are 
dissatisfied with the content of land plans to bide their time until on-
the-ground damage was imminent, no matter how inevitable that 
damage might have been at the planning stage.122 
B. The Conflict in SUWA: Unregulated ORV Use in WSAs 
SUWA involved a conflict over off-road vehicle (ORV) use on 
wilderness study areas on BLM lands in Utah.  In 1991, the Secretary 
of Interior recommended that Congress designate as wilderness 1.9 
million acres of the 5.2 million acres of BLM land that the agency 
inventoried for wilderness characteristics in Utah.123  BLM must 
manage a study area under consideration for wilderness designation 
as if it were designated wilderness until Congress makes a final 
 120. The Court noted that had the Sierra Club raised the argument that the forest plan’s 
approval of ORV use, its failure to close roads, and its failure to provide for additional trails, 
those claims might not have been barred by ripeness doctrine because they could have resulted 
in injury to an interested party without additional action.  Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 738.  By 
inference, this reasoning would also seem to apply to authorizing continuation of grazing. 
 121. Claims against site-specific actions authorized by land use plans would of course be 
ripe.  See Baker, supra note 109, at 95-106 (cataloging lower court decisions in challenges to 
forest plans during the first two years after Ohio Forestry, and concluding that ripeness 
problems did not prevent plaintiffs from proceeding with claims of procedural harm or 
challenges alleging site-specific harm).  One exception was in the Ninth Circuit, which adopted a 
broad interpretation of Ohio Forestry, concluding that a suit challenging the Forest Service’s 
failure to implement the monitoring requirements in a plan was not ripe.  Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. 
United States Forest Serv., 192 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 122. See Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 734 (explaining why broader, non-site-specific suits are 
not ripe by stating that “[t]he Sierra Club thus will have ample opportunity later to bring its 
legal challenge at a time when harm is more imminent and more certain”). 
 123. In FLPMA, Congress directed the Secretary of Interior to evaluate all BLM roadless 
areas (not merely those in Utah), mostly greater than 5000 acres, for suitability for wilderness 
designation under the Wilderness Act, by Oct. 21, 1991.  43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2000).  Based on 
that inventory, the Act required the Secretary to recommend, “from time to time,” wilderness 
lands to the President, whom the statute then required to make recommendations to Congress 
within two years of receiving the Secretary’s recommendation, as only Congress may designate 
land as wilderness.  Id. §§ 1782(a),(b).  See Final Wilderness Inventory Decision, 45 Fed. Reg. 
75,602, 75,604 (Nov. 14, 1980) (dropping 3.2 million of the 5.2 million acres the BLM 
inventoried from further consideration as wilderness for lack of wilderness characteristics); 
Bureau of Land Management, UTAH STATE WILDERNESS STUDY REPORT 3 (1991) 
(recommending designation of 1.9 million acres); see also Michael C. Blumm, The Bush 
Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy: A Trojan Horse Strategy for Advancing 
Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,397, 10,404 (2004) (discussing 
BLM’s wilderness inventories in Utah, and noting that in the 1990s, environmentalists identified 
an additional 5.9 million acres of potential wilderness in Utah that BLM overlooked). 
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determination about an area’s wilderness status.124  These “wilderness 
study areas” (WSAs) must be roadless and otherwise “without 
permanent improvements or human habitation . . . with the imprint of 
man’s work substantially unnoticeable” and encompass at least 5,000 
acres, or be “of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation 
and use in an unimpaired condition.”125  When Congress was unable 
to make final wilderness designations in Utah, FLPMA required 
BLM to manage the WSAs as de facto wilderness.126  BLM’s failure to 
do so could damage the wilderness characteristics of the WSAs, 
effectively preempting the congressional prerogative of designating 
those areas as wilderness.127 
Over the last two decades, ORV use has increased exponentially 
on public lands in Utah and around the country.128  In 1999, 
environmentalists filed suit to prevent further damage to BLM lands, 
seeking to require the agency to limit ORV use in nine Utah WSAs 
under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 
 124. See 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c).  BLM issued an “interim management policy” on wilderness 
management in 1979. Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Lands Under Wilderness 
Review, 44 Fed. Reg. 72,014 (Dec. 12, 1979) (requiring BLM to manage WSAs in a manner that 
ensures the wilderness values will not be impaired before Congress makes it final 
determination).  See also S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton (SUWA I),  301 F.3d 1217, 1225 
n.4 (10th Cir. 2002) (describing how BLM interpreted FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate in its 
interim management policy for WSAs). 
 125. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(a)-(c) (2000). 
 126. See 43 U.S.C § 1782(c) (2000) (requiring BLM to manage WSAs so as “not to impair 
the suitability of such areas for preservation as wilderness . . . “).  Congress was not only unable 
to designate wilderness areas in Utah, it largely failed to do so throughout the West.  Nearly 
twenty years later, the only BLM designated wilderness areas are in Arizona, Arizona Desert 
Wilderness Act of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4469, California, California Desert 
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, 108 Stat. 4471, and in southern Nevada, outside Las 
Vegas, Clark County Conservation of Public Land and Natural Resources Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-282, 116 Stat. 1994. 
 127. The Wilderness Act defines wilderness “as an area where the earth and its community 
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain . . . an area 
of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence . . . affected 
primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work substantially unnoticeable [and 
possessing] outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive or unconfined type of 
recreation . . . .”  16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000). 
 128. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 60 (2004).  In 2004, 
the Forest Service estimated that approximately 42 million people in the United States use 
ORVs each year, more than double the number of ORV users two decades before.  Id.  
Between 1998 and 2003, sales of ORVs doubled, with 900,000 new vehicles sold in the United 
States in 2003.  Id.  In Utah, ORV use has increased even more dramatically, with the number of 
registered ORVs in the state climbing from 9,000 in 1979 to 83,000 in 2000, to more than 120,000 
in 2007.  Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Off-Road Vehicles: Searching for Balance and 
Quiet in Utah’s Wilderness, http://www.suwa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=work_orv (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2007). 
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which provides a cause of action to injured members of the public to 
“compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed”.129  The 
environmentalists argued that BLM had a “mandatory, 
nondiscretionary duty”130 to conduct ORV monitoring in the Henry 
Mountains under the Factory Butte area land plan and to complete 
an ORV implementation plan for the San Rafael plan.131  The Factory 
Butte plan stated that because of existing damage, ORV use in the 
area “will be monitored and closed if warranted,” and also more 
generally provided for “use supervision and monitoring” in WSAs.132  
In addition to including a similar ORV use monitoring provision, the 
San Rafael plan promised that an ORV implementation plan for the 
area “will be developed.”133  The environmentalists charged that BLM 
failed to take a “hard look” at information about increased ORV use 
occurring in WSAs after plan approval to determine whether to 
supplement its outdated NEPA analysis for the areas, in order to 
evaluate the environmental effects of increased ORV activity.134 
Motorized recreationalists, the state of Utah, and a number of 
Utah counties intervened on the side of the federal government.135  
Although the district court criticized BLM for inadequately managing 
ORV use in Utah WSAs, writing that “the court might agree with 
[SUWA] that too little is done too slowly,” it concluded that BLM 
had not entirely abandoned its management duties, and therefore 
dismissed the environmentalists’ claims of failing to act under the 
APA.136  The district court also rejected the plaintiffs’ NEPA claim, 
concluding that because the decision to supplement NEPA analysis is 
“the kind of factual question that implicates agency technical 
 129. SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1223; 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000).  The APA states that “the 
reviewing court shall . . . compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  
SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1223. 
 130. SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1222. 
 131. Id. at 1234. 
 132. See Henry Mountain Resource Area Off-Road Vehicle Implementation Plan (Sept. 
1988), in Joint Appendix at 140, Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (No. 
03-101); SUWA, 542 U.S. at 68. 
 133. See Final Resource Management Plan, San Rafael Resource Area (May 1991), in Joint 
Appendix at 154 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004) (No. 03-101); 2003 
U.S. Briefs 101, 154; SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1234. 
 134. See SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1237.  BLM had not updated its NEPA analysis for any of the 
challenged land plans in more than a decade.  Id. 
 135. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Babbitt, No. 2:99CV852K, 2000 WL 33914094 at *1 (D. 
Utah Dec. 22, 2000). 
 136. Id. at *9. 
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expertise,” the court would defer to the agency’s judgment and not 
require BLM to supplement its NEPA analysis.137 
The Tenth Circuit reversed in 2002, holding that FLPMA 
imposed a nondiscretionary duty on BLM to manage WSAs to 
prevent impairment of wilderness values, and that BLM’s 
management may have violated this standard.138  Observing that 
under the APA a court may compel an agency to undertake an 
“unreasonably delayed or unlawfully withheld” action, even without a 
challenge to a site-specific action, the court ruled that efforts toward 
partial compliance did not prevent a court from compelling agency 
action under the APA.139  Further, the court held that BLM had a 
“mandatory, nondiscretionary duty” to comply with the ORV use 
monitoring provision in the Factory Butte plan and the ORV 
implementation provision in the San Rafael plan.140  The Tenth 
Circuit also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the NEPA claim, 
ruling that the lower court misconstrued the claim that BLM failed to 
take a “hard look” at whether it should supplement its NEPA 
analysis as a claim requesting the court to compel BLM to actually 
supplement its analysis.141  The Supreme Court accepted the 
government’s petition for certiorari142 and unanimously reversed the 
Tenth Circuit.143 
C. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
The Supreme Court considered three issues: (1) whether BLM 
violated FLPMA by failing to manage WSAs in a manner that would 
prevent impairment; (2) whether BLM violated provisions in its land 
plans calling for monitoring ORV use; and (3) whether BLM violated 
 137. Id. 
 138. SUWA I, 301 F.3d at 1224.  BLM argued that it could not be compelled to act because it 
had taken some steps to address ORV activity by closing some routes and posting signs 
prohibiting ORV use in others.  The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that partial 
compliance that falls short of satisfying an actual legal requirement was insufficient to moot a 
claim to compel an agency to fulfill its obligations.  Id. at 1231. 
 139. Id. at 1235-36. 
 140. Id. at 1236. 
 141. Id. at 1239.  A dissent agreed with the majority that BLM could be compelled to take a 
hard look to consider whether it should supplement its NEPA analysis.  Id. at 1240 (McKay, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 142. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 540 U.S. 980 (2003).  Motorized recreationalists 
also petitioned for certiorari.  See Utah Shared Access Alliance v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance 
(SUWA), 542 U.S. 917 (2004) (remanding the case after the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit 
decision in SUWA I). 
 143. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 56 (2004). 
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NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at whether it was necessary for 
the agency to produce a supplemental EIS for land plans in areas 
experiencing a substantial increase in ORV use that was not 
anticipated in the initial EIS on the land plans.144  In an opinion by 
Justice Scalia, the Court unanimously ruled in favor of BLM on all 
counts.145 
The Court first addressed when a federal court may order an 
agency to take action under the APA, which authorizes suits by 
anyone “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 
relevant statue.”146  “Agency action,” under the APA, is “the whole or 
a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the 
equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”147  Justice Scalia first 
concluded the APA authorizes actions against an agency for a failure 
to act only when it fails to take one of the “discrete agency actions” 
mentioned above.148  Second, Scalia acknowledged that the APA 
provided courts with the authority to compel agencies to take action 
“unlawfully withheld” under a specific statute, which also amounted 
to a “discrete” action.149  Thus, under SUWA, there are two forms of 
discrete action that are actionable under the APA: one that is 
specifically mentioned in the APA itself;150 and one that is specifically 
required of an agency by another statute.151  These limitations on suits 
 144. Id. at 60-61. 
 145. Id. at 56. 
 146. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).  Only final agency actions may be challenged under the APA.  
Id. § 704. 
 147. Id. § 551(13) (emphasis added). 
 148. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62. 
 149. Id.  Justice Scalia concluded that “discrete agency actions” were those which fit within 
the definition of the different categories of “agency action,” as defined by the APA.  Id.  The 
APA defines “agency action” to include “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, 
sanction, [or] relief.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000).  Under the APA, a “rule” includes “an agency 
statement of . . . future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”  Id. § 
551(4).  An “order” includes “a final disposition . . . in a matter other than rulemaking.”  Id. § 
551(6).  A “license” means “a permit . . . or other form of permission.”  Id. § 551(8).  A 
“sanction” includes a “prohibition . . . or . . . taking [of] other compulsory or restrictive action.”  
Id. § 551(10).  “Relief” includes a “grant of money, assistance, license, authority” or 
“recognition of a claim, right, or immunity,” or the “taking of other action on the application or 
petition or, and beneficial to a person.”  Id. § 551(11). 
 150. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 62; 5 U.S.C. § 551(13); see also supra note 148 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 63; see also supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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against agencies are, in Justice Scalia’s words, necessary to avoid 
“broad programmatic attack[s]” on agency decision making.152 
Scalia did acknowledge the mandatory nature of FLPMA’s 
requirement that BLM manage WSAs in a manner that prevents 
impairment of wilderness characteristics.153  But because he thought 
BLM had “a great deal of discretion in deciding how to achieve it,” 
the requirement was not the type of “discrete” action which a federal 
court may compel agency action under the APA.154 
The Court also rejected SUWA’s claim that BLM violated the 
land plans’ promises that ORV use “‘will be monitored and closed if 
warranted’” by failing to monitor ORV use.155  Because BLM 
completed a route designation plan for the San Rafael area by the 
time the case reached the Court, Justice Scalia declared the claims 
regarding that plan to be moot.  Concerning BLM’s ORV use 
monitoring in the Henry Mountains under the Factory Butte land 
plan,156  Justice Scalia thought that “allowing general enforcement of 
plan terms would lead to pervasive interference with BLM’s own 
ordering of priorities.”157  Thus, BLM’s failure to undertake an action 
that the agency promised, in the land use plan, to undertake did not 
violate FLPMA’s requirement that BLM manage lands “in 
accordance with” land use plans158 because, in the Court’s view, “a 
land use plan is generally a statement of priorities; it guides and 
 152. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 64.  Justice Scalia also authored Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), in which the Court rejected a challenge to the BLM’s “land 
withdrawal review” program on the ground that there was no program, and therefore no agency 
action.  797 U.S. at 879, discussed supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.  But see Konrad, 
supra note 100, at 534 (arguing that the FLPMA’s non-impairment mandate did in fact satisfy 
Lujan’s requirements for “agency action,” which the Court in turn relied on in SUWA). 
 153. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 66. 
 154. Id.  While he did not consider FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate for managing WSAs 
to be a “discrete” action that could be challenged under the APA, Justice Scalia earlier 
concluded that a biological opinion prepared under the Endangered Species Act was a “final 
agency action” challengeable under section 704 of the APA in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 
178-79 (1997) (holding that irrigators could challenge a biological opinion addressing Bureau of 
Reclamation dam operations on the Klamath River as a final agency action because the opinion 
marked the “consummation” of the agency’s decision-making process, and because it had 
“direct and appreciable legal consequences”). 
 155. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 68. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 71.  The Court was concerned that allowing land use plan enforcement by citizens 
would place an undue burden on land management decision making because “allowing general 
enforcement of plan terms would lead to pervasive interference with BLM’s own ordering of 
priorities.”  Id. 
 158. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2000). 
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constrains actions, but does not (at least in the usual case) prescribe 
them.”159  Unless a land plan supplies a “clear indication of binding 
commitment,” the Court thought that the judiciary could not compel 
an agency to take an action based solely on the terms of the plan.160  A 
different conclusion, Justice Scalia opined, would leave federal 
agencies with meddlesome lawsuits by environmental plaintiffs and, 
consequently, future land plans would become “much vaguer.”161 
Justice Scalia’s professed concern about the future vagueness of 
land plans was pure judicial sophistry; in fact, one of the chief legacies 
of the SUWA decision has been new Forest Service planning 
regulations calling for vague terms in land use plans in order to avoid 
creating legally binding commitments that the public could 
challenge.162  And it was hardly clear why a promise in a land plan 
that an agency “will” undertake a certain action163 was not such a 
“binding commitment.”  Nor was it clear what it would take to create 
such a commitm
Finally, the Court decided that BLM did not violate NEPA by 
failing to take a “hard look” to consider whether it should prepare a 
supplemental EIS on land use plans for areas experiencing increased 
ORV use.165  The Court did not analyze whether increased ORV use 
qualified as a “significant new circumstance”166—instead, it 
maintained that because the land use plan was not an ongoing major 
federal action, additional NEPA analysis would be required only if 
BLM was amended or revised.167 
 159. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 71. 
 160. Id. at 69. 
 161. Id. at 72.  According to the Court, such vague land use plans would result in “making 
coordination with other agencies more difficult, . . . depriving the public of important 
information concerning the agency’s long-range intentions.”  Id. 
 162. See 2006 Memorandum from Coggins et al., updating the 5th ed. of FEDERAL PUBLIC 
LAND AND RESOURCES LAW, at 125 (highlighting SUWA’s influence on the 2005 planning rule) 
(on file with author).  See also infra notes 271-93 (discussing recent agency amendments to the 
planning process in the 2005 planning rule). 
 163. See Henry Mountain Resource Area Off-Road Vehicle Implementation Plan (Sept. 
1988), supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 164. Justice Scalia unhelpfully suggested that what was required was a “clear indication of 
binding commitment in the terms of the plan.”  SUWA, 542 U.S. at 69. 
 165. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 72. 
 166. Id. at 73. 
 167. Id.  According to Justice Scalia, because “ ‘[a]pproval of a [land use plan]’ is a ‘major 
Federal action’ requiring an EIS, that action is completed when the plan is approved.  The land 
use plan is the ‘proposed action’ contemplated by the regulation.  There is no ongoing ‘major 
Federal action’ that could require supplementation . . . .”  Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
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Together with Lujan and Ohio Forestry, SUWA established a 
trilogy of constraints on the public’s ability to challenge federal 
agency land use decisions.168  After Lujan, citizens lacked standing to 
bring programmatic challenges against agency land management 
policies; they were left with challenging only individual action taken 
under the same policy of revoking land withdrawals.169  Then, in Ohio 
Forestry, citizens lost the ability to challenge the terms of land use 
plans outside the context of a site-specific action.170  Finally, the 
SUWA decision deprived citizens of the ability to compel an agency 
to fulfill most of its commitments in a federal land plan, or even to 
compel an agency to take a “hard look” at whether it had a duty to 
supplement its NEPA analysis for a plan due to changed 
circumstances or new information, apparently confining supplemental 
NEPA analysis to plan amendments or revisions.171  The combination 
of the three cases appeared to amount to a straightjacket on public 
challenges to agency land use plans. 
III.  SUWA’S EFFECT ON LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
SUWA’s effect on environmental litigants was both immediate 
and chilling.172  The Supreme Court had accepted certiorari on 
another land plan challenge during the 2004 term, a Ninth Circuit 
decision concluding that the Forest Service had a nondiscretionary 
duty to maintain the wilderness characteristics in WSAs in 
Montana.173  After its decision in SUWA, the Court vacated the 
 168. Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). 
 169. Id.  See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text (discussing Lujan). 
 170. Ohio Forestry v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).  See supra notes 110-18 and 
accompanying text (discussing Ohio Forestry). 
 171. SUWA, 542 U.S. at 55.  See supra notes 142-67 and accompanying text (discussing 
SUWA). 
 172. SUWA’s effect on wilderness in Utah has been especially harsh.  After the Court’s 
decision, the Bush Administration entered a settlement agreement with the state of Utah 
revoking post-1991 WSAs in the state and eliminating new designations.  See Henry Weinstein, 
Utah Wilderness Appeal Rejected, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A27; see also Blumm, supra note 
123, at 10, 406–07 (noting that in the 2003 Utah settlement, BLM agreed not to manage lands as 
WSAs not identified prior to 1993, including 2.6 million acres identified as WSAs in a 1999 
inventory, and the Department of Interior also agreed to revoke the Wilderness Handbook and 
other policies directing BLM to use the land planning process to identify potential wilderness 
areas); see also Perch-Ahern, supra note 100, at 422–29 (discussing early responses to SUWA in 
the lower courts). 
 173. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 314 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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SUWA.174  SUWA also led to the near-immediate reversal of another 
Ninth Circuit decision which held that the Forest Service’s failure to 
consider the fifty-seven rivers in Arizona qualifying for potential 
inclusion in the Wild and Scenic River System when revising forest 
plans was actionable under APA as a failure to act.175  After SUWA, 
the Ninth Circuit withdrew its earlier opinion and ruled that the 
agency’s failure “to consider” was not a “discrete agency action,” and 
thus environmentalists lacked standing to bring their suit.176  Although 
SUWA did not entirely preclude judicial review of land plans,177 it has 
severely constricted the public’s ability to challenge agency action on 
a land plan level.178  Litigants must now instead challenge individual 
actions taken under land use plans, even if it is the terms of the plans 
themselves that are objectionable.179 
 174. Veneman v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 542 U.S. 917 (2004).  On remand, the Ninth 
Circuit sent the case back to the district court.  Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 376 
F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 175. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 335 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2003) (placing heavy 
reliance on the original Ninth Circuit Montana Wilderness Association opinion).  When the 
Supreme Court remanded Montana Wilderness Association, 542 U.S. 917, the Ninth Circuit 
reconsidered its decision and reversed itself.  Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 
1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 176. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 394 F.3d at 1113. 
 177. See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Rasmussen, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215 (D. Or. 2006) 
(holding that BLM’s approval of projects without sufficient information about wilderness values 
to make a reasoned decision of environmental impacts violated NEPA); Friends of Yosemite 
Valley v. Scarlett, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1089-90 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that SUWA did not 
preclude an action challenging a record of decision adopting a revised plan); Soda Mountain 
Wilderness Council v. Norton, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1259-60 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (distinguishing 
SUWA both because the challenged action was an affirmative decision to amend a plan and 
because the original plan contained language stating the plan represented “BLM’s commitment 
to these public desires and constitutes a compact with the public” to consolidate public lands 
with outstanding recreation opportunities or imperiled biological resources); Ctr. for Biological 
Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling that it 
was arbitrary and capricious for BLM to approve a land management plan without taking the 
presence of listed species into consideration); W. Watersheds Project v. Bennett, 392 F. Supp. 2d 
1217, 1227-28 (D. Idaho 2005) (rejecting a BLM argument that land use plan provisions were 
unenforceable under SUWA and holding that BLM’s failure to comply with a land plan’s 
monitoring requirements violated the land use plan). 
 178. See Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 378 F. Supp. 2d 835, 845 (S.D. Ohio 
2005) (holding that SUWA foreclosed a claim to compel the Forest Service to prepare a 
supplemental EIS for a forest plan when an endangered species was discovered in a forest and 
the existing forest plan did not reflect the species’ presence); Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. 
Nicholas, 343 F. Supp. 2d 687, 712-14 (S.D. Ill. 2004) (ruling that under SUWA, the Forest 
Service could not be compelled by recreationalists to undertake a trail maintenance program 
that could lead to reinstatement of ORV use in a national forest). 
 179. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 69-70 (2004). 
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Federal agencies have argued that SUWA bars numerous types 
of challenges to land planning decisions in a variety of contexts.180  
Paul Smyth, Acting Associate Solicitor for the Division of Land and 
Water Resources for the Department of Interior, described the 
decision as adding a new weapon for federal agencies to deploy in 
litigation “in a wide range of public land and natural resource cases 
and beyond.”181  BLM characterized the land plan ORV use 
monitoring requirements, as well as the agency’s land inventorying 
responsibilities, as “agency conduct.”182  BLM not only argued in 
SUWA that its land plans were not ongoing agency actions, the 
agency also maintained that broad categories of activities were 
unreviewable and “emphasized the difference between agency 
conduct and agency action.”183  The agency contended that while 
agency “actions” were reviewable under the APA, agency “conduct” 
was not because it did not fit within the definition of the five types of 
agency action reviewable under the APA.184 
These arguments may have been a response to an unfavorable 
Ninth Circuit decision that interpreted land plans to have “ongoing 
effects extending beyond their mere approval.”185  That case, Pacific 
Rivers Council v. Thomas, required the Forest Service to undertake 
ESA consultation on the effects that already-approved forest plans 
might have on newly listed salmon species, rejecting the agency’s 
argument that land management plans are not ongoing actions, and 
instead describing plans to be “comprehensive management 
[documents] governing a multitude of individual projects . . . hav[ing] 
an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption.”186  The Forest 
Service suffered a similar setback in Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. 
U.S. Forest Service, when the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest 
Service violated NFMA by failing to demonstrate that a timber sale 
 180. See Paul B. Smyth & Christina S. Kalavritinos, The Supreme Court’s Decision: More 
than Another Lujan?, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 279, 280 (2004). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 293.  FLPMA requires BLM to maintain and update an inventory of the public 
lands and their resources under its management.  43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (2000). 
 183. Smyth & Kalavritinos, supra note 180, at 293. 
 184. Id.  The APA defines the term “agency action” to include “the whole or part of an 
agency rule, order, license, sanction, [or] relief.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000).  See supra notes 146-
52 (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of “agency action” in SUWA). 
 185. Pac. Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 186. Id. at 1053. 
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was consistent with the forest plan for the Payette National Forest.187  
The SUWA victory marked a significant reversal of fortune for the 
federal land managers, reducing their public accountability by 
reversing the accepted perception of land plans as enforceable 
documents with lasting effects.188 
The SUWA decision has been interpreted to be “significant for 
its recognition of the importance of administrative flexibility” and to 
prevent challenges in a range of situations in which the agency has 
failed to take a discretionary action.189  Land management agency 
lawyers have argued that SUWA bars a number of claims requesting 
that various agency actions be set aside as arbitrary and capricious 
because a great deal of agency activity does not in fact rise to the level 
of an “action” under the APA.190  The result has been the 
 187. 137 F.3d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1998).  NFMA requires the Forest Service to demonstrate 
that site-specific projects are consistent with the applicable forest plan.  16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) 
(2000).  In Cuddy Mountain, the Ninth Circuit held that a timber sale was inconsistent with the 
forest plan because the plan required the Forest Service to evaluate the effect of actions on 
species dependant on old-growth forest habitat by analyzing the effects of the action on certain 
management indicator species, and the Forest Service failed to analyze how the sale would 
effect old-growth habitat for the pileated woodpecker habitat, a management indicator species.  
137 F.3d at 1377. 
 188. Before SUWA and Ohio Forestry, challenges to land plans were generally considered 
ripe, and the plans themselves were enforceable on their terms.  See Res. Ltd., Inc. v. 
Robertson, 35 F.3d 1300, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the Forest Service’s argument that a 
challenge to the forest plan for the Flathead National Forest would not be ripe unless it was 
brought in the context of a site-specific action); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 
703 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “plaintiffs need not wait to challenge a specific project when 
their grievance is with an overall plan”); Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Babbitt, 998 F.2d 705, 708 
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding a Forest Service decision not to supplement the NEPA analysis on a 
forest plan was ripe because “to the extent these [plans] pre-determine the future, the 
Secretary’s failure to comply with NEPA represents a concrete injury that would undermine any 
future challenges”); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(noting that if challenges could not be brought against an EIS that was not site-specific the 
program could never be reviewed, and noting “[t]o the extent that the plan pre-determines the 
future, it represents a concrete injury that plaintiffs must, at some point, have standing to 
challenge”).  The effect of this turnabout in the enforceability of land plan terms is most 
dramatically demonstrated by two Ninth Circuit decisions which were reversed in SUWA’s 
immediate aftermath: Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2005), 
which is discussed supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text; and Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. 
U.S. Forest Serv., 314 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2003), which is discussed supra notes 173-74 and 
accompanying text. 
 189. Smyth & Kalavritinos, supra note 180, at 287-88. 
 190. An example of agency conduct not rising to the level of an “action,” and thus arguably 
unreviewable under SUWA, is BLM’s responsibility to conduct land inventories under FLPMA; 
which DOI attorney Paul Smyth has maintained are not actions because they do not “change or 
prevent change of the management or use of the public lands.”  Id. at 293, citing 43 U.S.C. § 
1711(a) (2000).  Section 551 of the APA defines “agency action” to include “the whole or part 
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transformation of land use plans from enforceable documents 
developed in a public process and providing the foundation for land 
management decision making into vague aspirational statements 
offering little or no opportunity for the public to obtain judicial 
review of an agency’s land management decisions. 
A. Environmental Challenges Precluded by SUWA 
The SUWA decision led to a series of government victories in 
cases challenging Forest Service and BLM grazing decisions in 
Oregon filed by the Oregon Natural Desert Association (ONDA).  
For example, in ONDA v. Taylor, a district court relied on the Ninth 
Circuit’s interpretation of SUWA in Center for Biological Diversity to 
conclude that grazing assessments, evaluations, and determinations 
required by BLM’s FLPMA regulations were not discrete agency 
actions.191  In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected ONDA’s 
contention that BLM failed to undertake a discrete action when it did 
not begin promised rangeland health assessments in seven grazing 
management areas in Eastern Oregon.192 
In another case, ONDA v. Rasmussen, a district judge rejected 
ONDA’s claim that BLM violated FLPMA by failing to maintain an 
inventory of wilderness values for an Eastern Oregon grazing area 
that BLM concluded lacked wilderness values in a 1989 inventory.193  
ONDA also argued that BLM violated NEPA by failing to consider 
of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to 
act.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000). 
 191. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Taylor, No. 04-334-KI, 2005 WL 106599, at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 
18, 2005), (relying on Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Veneman, 394 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2005)).  
Center for Biological Diversity is discussed supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text. 
 192. Taylor, 2005 WL 106599, at *6.  Federal Rangeland Health regulations require BLM to 
develop state standards and guidelines for managing livestock grazing on public lands consistent 
with ecological criteria to ensure watershed health, water quality, and wildlife habitat are 
maintained or restored on public rangelands.  43 C.F.R. § 4180.1 (2006).  These regulations also 
authorize BLM to conduct an assessment of whether the standards are being met in an area and, 
if they are not, to take action to help move the area toward compliance with the standards.  43 
C.F.R. § 4180.2(c) (2006).  ONDA argued that when BLM failed to perform such assessments 
on seven grazing management areas in the Jordan Resource Area, the agency failed to make a 
mandatory determination of whether the area met the rangeland health standards.  Taylor, 2005 
WL 106599, at *4.  The court rejected this argument, holding that under SUWA, a failure to 
consider certain issues in making planning decisions does not constitute a failure to take a 
discrete agency action.  Id. at *5. 
 193. 451 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215 (D. Or. 2006).  FLPMA requires BLM to maintain a current 
inventory of the lands and their resources under its management.  43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (2000).  
ONDA argued that by failing to maintain an inventory of the area’s wilderness values, BLM 
failed to identify additional WSAs the agency overlooked in the initial 1989 inventory.  
Rasmussen, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1206–07. 
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both whether the area’s wilderness values had changed based on new 
evidence that some areas contained wilderness characteristics 
warranting designation as a WSA, and whether proposed grazing in 
the area might have a negative effect on these wilderness values.194  
The Rasmussen court relied on Center for Biological Diversity v. 
Bureau of Land Management, a California district court case in which 
environmentalists presented similar arguments, to conclude that BLM 
did not violate FLPMA by failing to maintain a current inventory, but 
the agency did violate NEPA by not considering sufficient 
information about species to make a reasoned decision.195  In ONDA 
v. Bureau of Land Management, ONDA made similar arguments, 
claiming that BLM violated NEPA by failing to consider new 
information indicating the presence of additional WSAs and violated 
FLPMA by failing to maintain a current wilderness inventory before 
approving its Southeast Oregon land use plan.196  The magistrate 
judge ruled against ONDA on both counts, holding that the NEPA 
claim failed because a wilderness inventory “does not by itself change 
the management or use public lands” and that the FLPMA claim was 
not ripe for review because the land plan did not authorize any site-
specific actions, citing Ohio Forestry.197  ONDA has appealed this 
decision to the Ninth Circuit.198 
 194. Rasmussen, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 1211. 
 195. Id. at 1212–13. 
 196. No. Civ. 03-1017-JE, 2005 WL 711663, at *4 (D. Or. Mar. 29, 2005). 
 197. Id. at *4-*5. 
 198. Opening Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants, Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land 
Mgmt., No. 05-35931 (9th Cir. Jun. 8, 2006).  ONDA has made similar arguments in three other 
cases.  In ONDA v. Shuford, an Oregon district judge rejected ONDA’s arguments that BLM 
violated NEPA when it failed to take a hard look at new information indicating additional 
potential WSAs existed before adopting its Andrews-Steens land use plan and violated FLPMA 
by failing to maintain an inventory of wilderness values in the area.  No. 06-242-AA, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 42614, (D. Or. Jun. 8, 2007).  The court held that here, unlike Rasmussen, BLM 
fulfilled its NEPA obligations because it considered – and largely rejected – the ONDA 
assessments of the area’s wilderness characteristics.  Id. at *7-*8.  The court also rejected 
ONDA’s FLPMA claims, holding that SUWA barred any failure to act claim because 
maintaining an existing inventory was within the agency’s discretion, and further, that ONDA 
failed to demonstrate that BLM’s existing inventory was so outdated and inaccurate as to render 
the decision to approve the land use plan arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at *9-*11. 
  In ONDA v. Gammon, ONDA challenged BLM’s decision to adopt its Lakeview land 
use plan without considering new information that additional WSAs existed in the area in its 
NEPA analysis and because BLM failed to maintain a wilderness inventory under FLPMA.  No. 
06-523-HO, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48083, at *1- *2 (D. Or. Jun. 28, 2007).  Citing SUWA, the 
court rejected ONDA’s argument that BLM violated FLPMA by failing to maintain a current 
wilderness inventory, stating that such claims “are not susceptible to judicial enforcement.”  Id. 
at *8.  Further, the court ruled in favor of BLM on the NEPA claim, holding that the agency 
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Another ONDA suit affected by SUWA concerned a challenge 
to the Forest Service’s failure to comply with several provisions of the 
Wild & Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA).199  The WSRA requires the 
Forest Service to prepare a “comprehensive management plan” for 
each designated river segment.200  ONDA claimed that the Forest 
Service had failed in its duty to “provide for the protection of the 
river values, address resource protection and other management 
practices” for two Oregon WSRA river segments,201 and that the 
agency also failed to manage the protected rivers “in such a manner 
as to protect and enhance” the values which earned the river 
segments protection under the WSRA.202  The district court 
concluded that both provisions created general duties for the agency 
but neither required any discrete agency action, and therefore the suit 
was barred under SUWA.203  Although the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court on another issue in the case – whether the Annual 
Operating Instructions (AOI) the Forest Service issued to grazing 
permit holders each year were final agency actions – it did not disturb 
the lower court’s WRSA rulings
In a case decided shortly after SUWA, an Illinois district court 
ruled that an ORV user group’s attempt to compel the Forest Service 
to conduct an ORV use analysis in the Shawnee National Forest was 
barred by SUWA.205  The ORV group had challenged the Forest 
acted within its discretion and thus did not violate NEPA when it issued the Lakeview land use 
plan without updating its wilderness inventories.  Id. at *9.  Another case, ONDA v. Freeborn, is 
pending before the district court.  In Freeborn, ONDA challenged a BLM rangeland project in 
Louse Canyon, located in the Jordan Resource Area, arguing that BLM failed to consider the 
effect of proposed activities on wilderness values in the area by not updating its wilderness 
inventory for the area.  Complaint at 2, ONDA v. Freeborn, Civ. No. 06-1311-MO (D. Or. Sept. 
14, 2006). 
 199. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv. (ONDA), No. 03-213-JO, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 43637, at *8 (D. Or. Jun. 3, 2005). 
 200. 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d)(1) (2000).  The Forest Service completed management plans for 
the two river segments at issue in the suit.  ONDA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43637, at *36. 
 201. ONDA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43637, at *36. 
 202. Id. at *37. 
 203. Id. at *37-*38. 
 204. Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2006).  The 
Ninth Circuit held that AOIs were final agency actions because they “represent[ed] the 
consummation of the Forest Service’s determination regarding the extent, limitation, and other 
restrictions on a permit holder’s right to graze his livestock under the terms of the permit,” and 
therefore were properly characterized as a final agency decision.  Id. at 986-87.  The Forest 
Service argued that AOIs were neither “final” actions nor even “agency actions” under SUWA.  
Id. at 985.  The Ninth Circuit concluded that an AOI, as part of a grazing permit, was a license, 
and thus within the scope of “agency actions” identified as actionable in SUWA.  Id. at 990. 
 205. Shawnee Trail Conservancy v. Nicholas, 343 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701 (S.D. Ill. 2004). 
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Service’s failure to conduct an ORV use analysis because a court 
order from an earlier case206 prevented the Forest Service from 
allowing ORV use under its forest plan for the area until the agency 
analyzed the environmental effects.207  The court rejected this 
challenge, holding that the order required the Forest Service to 
refrain from allowing ORV use in the forest until it completed its 
analysis, but the order created no binding agency commitment to 
undertake that analysis unless it authorized ORV use.208 
B. Supplemental EISs on Land Use Plans After SUWA 
Federal litigants have argued, with some success, that SUWA not 
only bars claims to compel an agency to supplement its NEPA 
analysis for a land use plan but also bars claims to compel an agency 
to supplement its NEPA analysis for other actions, including issuing 
licenses, and approving timber sale contracts, and land use plan 
amendments.209  After SUWA, several district courts have ruled that 
once an agency approves a land use plan or issues a license, there is 
no ongoing action requiring supplemental NEPA analysis.210  For 
example, in Cold Mountain v. Garber, the Ninth Circuit held, with 
virtually no analysis, that SUWA barred the environmentalists’ claim 
that NEPA required supplemental analysis for a Forest Service 
special use permit allowing the Montana Department of Livestock to 
operate a “bison capture facility” just outside Yellowstone National 
Park in the Gallatin National Forest, based on new information that 
measures intended to protect bald eagles in the area failed, and that 
 206. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., No. 96-2244, 1997 WL 295308 (7th Cir. May 28, 
1997). 
 207. Shawnee Trail Conservancy, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 700. 
 208. Id. at 702. 
 209. See Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1101-
02 (D. Mont. 2006) (SUWA barred a claim that the Forest Service failed to supplement its 
NEPA analysis for a forest plan amendment); cf. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Boody, 
468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a Forest Service argument that land use plan 
amendments did not require NEPA analysis).  In one case, the federal government argued, 
unsuccessfully, that SUWA obviated the need for supplemental NEPA analysis for timber sale 
contracts which had been enjoined by court order.  Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. United 
States Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1222 (D. Or. 2006). 
 210. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that after the 
Forest Service issued a license, it had no obligation to supplement the NEPA analysis because 
there was no ongoing action); Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 378 F. Supp. 2d 835, 
844 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (finding that the Forest Service had no obligation to supplement NEPA 
analysis for a forest plan, even though an ESA-listed species was discovered in the forest). 
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the state violated the conditions of its permit.211  The court concluded 
that the Forest Service’s approval of the special use permit was 
analogous to issuing a license, and therefore a final action with no 
further NEPA obligations once the agency issued the license.212 
The forest plan for the Wayne National Forest, at issue in Ohio 
Forestry, was again challenged unsuccessfully by environmentalists in 
2005, in Buckeye Forest Council v. U.S. Forest Service.213  The district 
court held that SUWA barred an environmentalist claim that the 
Forest Service had to supplement the EIS on the forest plan after the 
Indiana bat, listed under the ESA, was discovered in the forest—the 
court reasoned that under SUWA once the agency approves a forest 
plan, the action is final, and thus there is no remaining action 
triggering a supplemental EIS.214 
Similarly, in Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service, a Montana federal district judge ruled that after SUWA, 
forest plan amendments, like forest plans themselves, were not 
ongoing agency actions that could require the Forest Service to 
supplement its NEPA analysis.215  The court rejected the 
environmentalists’ argument that the Forest Service should have 
supplemented its NEPA analysis for a forest plan amendment, 
designed to protect endangered grizzly bears by reducing the number 
of roads in the forest, when new information indicated an increase in 
grizzly bear deaths.216  The court thought that SUWA barred the claim 
because, like the land plan challenged in SUWA, the Forest Service 
completed its action when it approved the forest plan amendments.217  
Although the amendments required future agency action to move 
toward compliance with its road density standards and called for the 
Forest Service to meet milestones demonstrating its compliance, these 
future actions were not ongoing actions because the court concluded 
 211. 375 F.3d at 891.  The “bison capture facility” authorized by the special use permit was 
intended to help the state of Montana prevent wild bison from Yellowstone National Park from 
spreading brucellosis, a bovine bacterial infection which causes sterility in livestock, to Montana 
cattle.  The special use permit allowed the state to operate a facility to monitor, test, and remove 
bison testing positive for brucellosis, and authorized the state to use “hazing” to drive bison 
back into the park.  Id. at 886-87. 
 212. Id. at 894. 
 213. 378 F. Supp. 2d at 844-45. 
 214. Id. at 845.  This result directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s position regarding the 
Endangered Species Act in Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), 
discussed supra notes 185-86. 
 215. 465 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1100-01 (D. Mont. 2006). 
 216. Id. at 1101. 
 217. Id. at 1100-01. 
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that “the amendments do not require that any particular project be 
done.”218 
On the other hand, in Sierra Club v. Bosworth, a Northern 
California federal district court rejected the Forest Service’s 
argument that under SUWA, it had no obligation to supplement an 
EIS based on new information about the pacific fisher for four timber 
sales, two of which were located in Giant Sequoia National 
Monument, and the other two in the adjacent Sequoia National 
Forest.219  The court distinguished SUWA, where there was no 
ongoing federal action after BLM approved a land plan, from a 
decision to approve a timber sale contract, holding that the latter was 
an ongoing action because the timber projects were site-specific 
actions that had not yet been completed and were subject to contract 
clauses allowing the Forest Service to terminate the contract.220 
An Oregon district court also rejected the Forest Service’s 
argument that there was no ongoing federal action, and thus no duty 
to supplement its NEPA analysis, after the district court enjoined the 
agency’s decision to award six timber sale contracts in the Mt. Hood 
and Willamette National Forests.221  Because the court set aside the 
Forest Service’s original decision to award the timber contracts, it 
concluded that a federal action requiring supplemental NEPA 
analysis remained.222 
In Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Boody, BLM argued 
that modifications to an existing land management plan based on an 
annual species review did not amend the land use plan and therefore 
did not require supplemental NEPA analysis under SUWA.223  A 
district court agreed.224  However, the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
rejecting the agency’s argument and ruling instead that the annual 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 935-39. 
 220. Id. at 939.  The court also distinguished Cold Mountain, discussed supra notes 210-12 
and accompanying text, because the special use permit involved there was a license which did 
not anticipate ongoing agency obligations as the timber contracts did.  Id. 
 221. Or. Natural Res. Council Action v. U.S. Forest Serv., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1222 (D. 
Or. 2006). 
 222. Id. at 1222. 
 223. 468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th Cir. 2006), reversing Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau 
of Land Mgmt., No. 03-3124-CO, 2006 WL 448714, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 21, 2006) (holding that a 
BLM decision to modify the survey and manage protections for the red tree vole did not amend 
the land use plan). 
 224. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 2006 WL 448714, at *2 (holding that annual species 
reviews did not amend the land use plan and therefore BLM had no obligation to update its 
NEPA analysis). 
  
144 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 18:105 
 
species reviews in fact amended the land use plan, and SUWA did not 
completely absolve an agency from supplementing its NEPA analysis 
when it amends a land use plan.225 
In sum, federal agencies have experienced considerable, if not 
universal, success in arguing that they have no obligation to 
supplement their NEPA analysis after SUWA.  Courts have found 
this argument persuasive when the NEPA analysis concerned a final 
action, and the challenge is to the agency’s implementation that 
action, such as a license,226 ongoing management of a forest under an 
approved forest plan,227 or commitments in a forest plan 
amendment.228  SUWA has not absolved agencies from all obligations 
to provide supplemental NEPA analysis, however.  Courts have held 
that ongoing actions, such as the Forest Service’s management of 
timber contracts for projects that are not yet complete,229 as well as 
the initial decision to approve a forest plan amendment,230 still require 
supplemental NEPA analysis. 
C. Land Plan Challenges Not Barred by SUWA 
Just as Ohio Forestry’s ruling that a challenge to a forest plan was 
not ripe limited but did not eviscerate the public’s ability to challenge 
forest plans, SUWA did not preclude all attempts to enforce the terms 
of federal land use plans.  Shortly after the Court’s SUWA decision, in 
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Patterson, a California district 
court rejected BLM’s argument that an attempt to compel the agency 
to comply with a California law requiring dam operators to allow 
sufficient river flow for fish passage was a programmatic challenge, 
and thus barred by both SUWA and Lujan.231  The court ruled that 
 225. Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr., 468 F.3d at 561. 
 226. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing Cold Mountain). 
 227. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (discussing Buckeye Forest Council). 
 228. See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text (discussing Cabinet Resource Group). 
 229. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club and Oregon 
Natural Resources Council Action). 
 230. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands 
Center). 
 231. 333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 915-16 (E.D. Cal. 2004).  The environmentalists alleged BLM’s 
operation of Friant Dam on the San Joaquin River violated a California statute requiring dam 
operators to allow sufficient water for fish passage and to protect fish populations below the 
dam.  Id. at 910.  The Reclamation Act of 1902 requires the Secretary of Interior to comply with 
applicable state laws in operating dams under the act.  43 U.S.C. § 383 (2000).  The California 
law stated that dam owners “shall allow sufficient water at all times to pass through a fishway, or 
in the absence of a fishway, allow sufficient water to pass over, around or through the dam, to 
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BLM’s obligation to comply with the state law was a discrete, 
required action—not a “general statutory directive”—and 
distinguished SUWA on that ground.232 
Similarly, in Western Watersheds Project v. Bennett, a federal 
district judge in Idaho rejected BLM’s argument that land plan 
provisions were unenforceable under SUWA.233  Environmentalists 
argued that BLM violated FLMA’s requirement that the agency 
manage lands consistent with land plans by approving increased 
grazing without first monitoring for sensitive species in the Jarbidge 
Resource Area in southern Idaho, even though the land plan stated 
that grazing “would not be authorized unless monitoring studies 
indicate that the basic soil, vegetation and wildlife resources are being 
protected and additional forage is available.”234  The court 
distinguished SUWA as limited to the context of an agency’s failure to 
act, and therefore inapplicable in the context of a challenge to an 
agency action inconsistent with an approved land use plan.235 
In Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Scarlett, an Eastern California 
district judge ruled that SUWA did not bar a challenge brought by 
environmentalists to the National Park Service’s implementation of a 
land plan for the Merced River corridor prepared under the 
WSRA.236  And in Soda Mountain Wilderness Council v. Norton, 
another California district judge rejected BLM’s argument that 
SUWA precluded an environmentalist claim under FLPMA, 
distinguishing SUWA on several grounds.237  The court noted that, 
unlike SUWA, the challenge involved a final agency action: BLM’s 
keep in good condition any fish that may be planted or exist below the dam.”  CAL. FISH & 
GAME CODE § 5937 (2007). 
 232. Natural Res. Def. Council, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 916. 
 233. 392 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Idaho 2005). 
 234. Id. at 1227 (citing Jarbidge Resource Area Resource Management Plan Record of 
Decision at I-7 (1987)).  Under FLPMA, BLM must manage the public lands consistent with 
land use plans.  43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2000). 
 235. Western Watersheds Project, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.  Because BLM’s actions were 
inconsistent with a land use plan EIS prioritizing wildlife protection over grazing interests, the 
agency violated FLPMA’s requirement that BLM manage lands consistent with land use plans.  
Id. at 1227-28. 
 236. 439 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1089-90 (E.D. Cal. 2006).  The management plan was prepared 
under a court order after environmentalists first challenged the National Park Service’s failure 
to prepare a comprehensive management plan for a segment of the Merced River corridor 
under its jurisdiction after it had been designated a WSRA.  After NPS issued a management 
plan and EIS, environmentalists challenged both, and the original plan was invalidated by the 
Ninth Circuit for failing to comply with NEPA by inadequately considering ORV use in the 
area.  Id. at 1077-78. 
 237. 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1259-60 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
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decision to amend a land use plan.238  In addition, the court also 
concluded that BLM had made a binding commitment to engage in a 
specified process before consolidating or disposing of public lands.239  
Environmentalists argued, and the court agreed, that language in the 
record of decision for the land plan stating that it “represents BLM’s 
commitment to these public desires and constitutes a compact with 
the public” indicated the type of “binding commitment” the Supreme 
Court stated was necessary to make a land use plan enforceable on its 
terms.240  Ascertaining precisely what amounts to the binding 
commitment the SUWA opinion called for241 will likely produce 
considerable litigation in the future. 
BLM was likewise unsuccessful in arguing that SUWA bars 
challenges to inadequate NEPA analysis at the time a land use plan is 
approved in Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land 
Management.242  The court held that BLM’s NEPA analysis for its 
land use plan for the Algodones Dunes in Southern California was 
inadequate because it failed to take the required “hard look” at the 
effect of the land plan on endemic vertebrates.243  Environmentalists 
also argued that BLM’s failure to maintain a current inventory for the 
lands at issue, as required by FLPMA, led the agency to act arbitrarily 
when it approved its land plan based on an outdated inventory.244  
Although the court noted that FLPMA did not require BLM to 
maintain a current inventory on every species, and that land use plan 
monitoring directives were not enforceable under SUWA, it 
nonetheless held that BLM acted arbitrarily in approving a land use 
plan based on “obviously outdated and inadequate inventories” when 
the record contained evidence BLM was aware species not included 
in the inventory were present in the area.245  In the wake of SUWA, it 
seems that NEPA may impose more enforceable obligations than 
does FLPMA. 
 238. Id. at 1260. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004), discussed supra 
notes 159-61. 
 242. 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 243. Id. at 1163. 
 244. Id. at 1167.  See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (discussing FLPMA’s 
inventory requirement in the context of ONDA v. Rasmussen). 
 245. Id. at 1167-68. 
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D. SUWA’s Litigation Legacy 
Although not all land use plan terms are unenforceable after 
SUWA, the decision has imposed significant limits on the public’s 
ability to judicially challenge land planning decisions.  The 
government has successfully argued that under SUWA monitoring, 
analysis, and inventory requirements in land plans are 
unenforceable.246  But challenges to other agency actions as being 
inconsistent with an applicable land use plan,247 particularly plan 
provisions that bind an agency to a specific course of action,248 are not 
barred by SUWA.  SUWA should also not serve as a defense to 
challenges to failures to undertake specific actions where an agency 
has made a “binding commitment” to undertake,249 since the APA 
expressly authorizes suits to compel an agency to act where it is 
unlawful for it to not act.250  Nor should SUWA serve as a bar to 
challenges to agency actions implementing such directives,251 like 
annual operating instructions to graziers with Forest Service 
permits.252 
While SUWA insulates agencies from having to supplement 
NEPA analysis on land plans and similar final actions like issuing 
licenses or existing land plan amendments,253 agencies should still be 
required to supplement NEPA analysis for ongoing actions like 
timber sale contracts, or when an agency approves a land plan 
amendment.254  SUWA’s holding concerning NEPA supplementation 
applies only to approved land plans or other agency actions that 
“end” when the agency approves the plan or the action.  Thus, for 
example, the SUWA defense would not seem to excuse a failure to 
 246. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (discussing Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Veneman); supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text (discussing the ONDA 
decisions). 
 247. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (discussing Western Watersheds Project). 
 248. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text (discussing Natural Resources Defense 
Council); supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text (discussing Friends of Yosemite and Soda 
Mountain Wilderness). 
 249. See supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (discussing Soda Mountain Wilderness). 
 250. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2000). 
 251. See id. § 706(2) (authorizing suits against, inter alia, arbitrary actions, actions 
inconsistent with statutory directives, and inconsistent with procedures required by law). 
 252. See ONDA v. U.S. Forest Serv., 465 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 2006), discussed supra notes 
199-204 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 211-18 and accompanying text (discussing Cold Mountain, Buckeye 
Forest Council, and Cabinet Resource Group). 
 254. See supra notes 219-25 and accompanying text (discussing Sierra Club, Oregon Natural 
Resources Council Action, and Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center). 
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prepare supplemental NEPA analysis for a BLM allotment 
management plan, when new information or circumstances would 
trigger NEPA’s supplemental analysis requirements.255  So the NEPA 
role in land management has not been eviscerated by the SUWA 
decision, although a recent attempt to change the Forest Service’s 
planning regulations would have imposed additional obstacles to 
public challenges of land planning decisions, including new 
categorical exclusions from NEPA analysis. 
IV.  SUWA’S INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC LAND PLANNING POLICIES 
Although SUWA has had a major effect on the enforceability of 
federal land plans, it also had an almost immediate—and dramatic—
effect on the nature of Forest Service planning.  At the time the Court 
decided SUWA, the Forest Service was already in the process of 
making radical revisions to its forest planning regulations, revoking 
regulations issued in the waning days of the Clinton Administration 
and rewriting the 1982 regulations adopted by the Reagan 
Administration, in order to increase agency discretion in land 
management decisions and decrease public oversight and judicial 
enforceability of forest plans.256  These revisions culminated in a 2005 
planning rule, which the Forest Service complemented with a series of 
categorical exclusions (CXs) that effectively removed a wide range of 
Forest Service activities from environmental review, including (1) fire 
suppression and salvage logging; (2) forest plan approval, 
amendments, and revisions; and (3) activities related to oil and gas 
exploration and development.257  Although a California district court 
 255. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(d) (2000).  An allotment management plan is a “document prepared 
in consultation with [the permitee] . . . [which, among other things] prescribes the manner in, 
and extent to, which livestock operations [on BLM or national forest lands] will be conducted in 
order to meet the multiple-use, sustained-yield, economic and other needs and objective as 
determined for the lands [by the land management agency].”  Id. § 1702(k). 
 256. See Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 774–75 (2006) 
(discussing the Forest Service’s decision to revoke the Clinton-era planning regulations and 
draft a radically different revision of the planning regulations); Katrina M. Kayden, Comment, 
Will Paradise Become a Parking Lot?: The Debate Over the Bush Administration’s Overhaul of 
Forest Management Regulations, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 291–94 (2006) (discussing the Bush 
Administration’s decision to jettison the 2000 planning regulations and the Forest Service’s 
development of the 2005 planning regulations). 
 257. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (discussing the Healthy Forests Initiative 
provisions exempting fire suppression and salvage logging from environmental review); infra 
notes 306-09 and accompanying text (discussing the 2006 CX for forest planning); and infra 
notes 310-12 and accompanying text (discussing the 2007 CX for certain oil and gas 
development activities). 
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enjoined the planning regulations in early 2007,258 the new CXs have 
helped transform Forest Service planning from the meaningful 
process Congress designed to both inform and impose limits on 
agency decision making through public involvement at the forest 
inventory stage into an exercise of largely unchecked agency 
discretion. 
A. The 2005 Forest Planning Rule Revisions 
In NFMA, Congress required the Forest Service to develop 
regulations for the forest planning process after convening an 
advisory Committee of Scientists populated with experts from outside 
the agency.259  By requiring the Forest Service to involve independent 
scientists in developing NFMA planning regulations, Congress aimed 
to ensure an outside scientific perspective influenced the content of 
the agency’s regulations.260  The Forest Service assembled the original 
committee to develop the initial 1979 planning regulations, then 
reconvened it in 1982 to revise the regulations under the Reagan 
Administration.261  After efforts to revise Forest Service planning 
 258. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1100 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007); see infra notes 289, 290 and accompanying text (discussing the decision to enjoin the 
2005 rule because 1) the Forest Service failed to comply with NEPA, 2) the 2005 rule was 
outside the scope of the CX the agency claimed applied, and 3) the rule failed to comply with 
both APA and the ESA).  The Forest Service has attempted to call the ruling into question by 
describing it as inconsistent with other recent rulings on forest plans by both the Tenth Circuit 
and an Alabama district judge.  See Felicity Barringer, Federal Judge Strikes Down Forest 
Management Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A9 (noting that Mark Rey, the Department of 
Agriculture Undersecretary who oversees the Forest Service, stated other recent decisions 
regarding forest plans contradicted the decision); Juliet Eilperin, Judge Suspends Administration 
Rules For Managing Forests, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2007, at A02 (quoting a Forest Service 
spokesperson as stating that the other courts “presented with similar circumstances” concluded 
that the agency had fulfilled its NEPA obligations).  Neither of those cases involved a challenge 
to the 2005 rule, however.  In Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Service, the Tenth Circuit upheld a lower 
court’s decision, ruling that environmentalists failed to demonstrate the Forest Service was 
arbitrary and capricious in developing a 2003 CE for small-scale timber harvests.  435 F.3d 1204, 
1220–22 (10th Cir. 2006).  The Alabama district court decision that Forest Service officials cited 
is similarly tangential to the California court’s conclusions about the 2005 rule.  In Wildlaw v. 
U.S. Forest Service, the court deferred to the Forest Service’s decision that the CE covering 
“routine” administrative actions applied to its revisions to a rule governing its administrative 
appeal procedures.  471 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2007). 
 259. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(h)(1) (2000). 
 260. See Charles F. Wilkinson, A Case Study in the Intersection of Law and Science: The 
1999 Report of the Committee of Scientists, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 307, 307 (2000). 
 261. Id. at 308 (stating that the committee was reconvened in 1982).  Congress included the 
requirement that the Forest Service develop the planning regulations under the advice of such a 
committee both to provide the opportunity to include different perspectives on the regulations 
and “because of skepticism regarding the Forest Service’s willingness to incorporate science into 
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regulations failed in the early 1990s, the Forest Service assembled a 
second Committee of Scientists in 1997.262  This second committee 
released a report in late 1999 entitled “Sustaining the People’s 
Lands,” which emphasized both ecological sustainability in forest 
planning and increased public participation to provide “early, broad, 
and significant [citizen] involvement in national forest stewardship.”263  
The Clinton Administration used the recommendations in the 1999 
committee report to develop a revised planning rule, issued in 
November 2000, with ecological sustainability as its centerpiece.264  In 
addition to ecological sustainability, the 2000 planning regulations 
also called for (1) rigorous scientific monitoring and evaluation 
requirements, (2) restoration of degraded lands, (3) incorporation of 
ecological principles by acknowledging uncertainty and disturbances, 
(4) use of species diversity to measure ecological sustainability and 
forest management decisions, and (5) independent scientific review.265 
The Bush Administration immediately moved to rescind the 2000 
rule in the spring of 2001, first by extending the deadline for 
compliance by a year.266  Then, in May 2002, the Administration 
pushed the deadline for compliance further back.267  In December 
2002, the Administration proposed a revised planning rule, stating 
that “[c]ompliance with the regulatory direction on such matters as 
ecological sustainability and science consistency checks would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish.”268  While the 2002 
proposed revisions were undergoing public review, the Forest Service 
issued an “interpretive rule” in 2004, which declared that until the 
management in a serious way.”  Id. at 307; see also Hoberg, supra note 26, at 6 (noting NFMA’s 
requirement that a committee of scientists must be consulted in formulating the planning 
regulations “clearly reflect[ed] a deep congressional distrust for the capacity of the Forest 
Service to develop regulations in a manner reflecting the new statutory standards”). 
 262. Wilkinson, supra note 260, at 308. 
 263. Id. at 309-10.  The report was criticized as overstepping the Committee’s statutory 
authority to provide scientific and technical advice by promoting a Clinton Administration 
policy agenda of making sustainability the Forest Service’s “primary goal.”  Hoberg, supra note 
26, at 17. 
 264. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 36 C.F.R. § 219 
(2000). 
 265. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES 
LAW 757-58 (5th ed. 2002). 
 266. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of 
Compliance Deadline, 66 Fed. Reg. 27,552, 27,553 (May 17, 2001). 
 267. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Extension of 
Compliance Deadline, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,431, 35,432 (May 20, 2002). 
 268. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Proposed Rules, 67 
Fed. Reg. 72,770, 72,772 (Dec. 6, 2002). 
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agency promulgated new planning regulations, the 1982 planning rule 
would govern forest plan amendments and revisions, except that the 
“transition provisions” of the 2000 rule – but not its substantive 
provisions – would govern site-specific actions.269  The 2000 rule’s 
transition provisions required the Forest Service to consider the “best 
available science” in gauging the effects of a proposed action on 
wildlife and forest health, replacing the 1982 management indicator 
species monitoring requirements.270  The Forest Service finally 
replaced the 2000 planning rule with a new rule in December 2005, 
without holding a public comment period or undertaking any NEPA 
analysis of the rule’s environmental effects.271  Further, the 2005 
planning rule cast aside the recommendations of the 1999 Committee 
of Scientists report and was developed without any advice of any 
scientific committee.272 
Ohio Forestry and SUWA influenced the final 2005 planning rule 
significantly.  The Forest Service cited language from both cases in its 
regulatory preamble to justify its treatment of forest plans as strategic 
 269. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Use of Best 
Available Science in Implementing Land Management Plans, 69 Fed. Reg. 58,055, 58056 (Sept. 
29, 2004).  The transition provisions directed the Forest Service to consider the “best available 
science” when making site-specific decisions implementing a forest plan.  36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) 
(2007).  This “best available science” standard replaced the 1982 regulation’s requirement that 
the Forest Service consider the effect of a site-specific action on “management indicator 
species,” — wildlife species the 1982 regulation required the Forest Service to monitor as 
proxies for overall forest health.  36 C.F.R. § 219.19(a)(1) (1982). 
 270. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning: Use of Best 
Available Science in Implementing Land Management Plans, 69 Fed. Reg. at 58,056.  See also 36 
C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982) (establishing criteria for selecting management indicator species in the 
1982 regulations). 
 271. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1022, 1023 (Jan. 5, 2005).  The Forest Service concluded that the 
2005 planning rule would “not have environmental effects” because the rule merely “provide[d] 
a starting point for project and activity NEPA analysis.”  Id. at 1031.  The Forest Service also 
concluded that the planning rule fit within the scope of a CX in the Forest Service Handbook 
that applied to “rules, regulations, or policies to establish Service-wide administrative 
procedures, program processes, or instruction.”  Id. at 1053–54; see also Forest Service 
Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 31.12 (2007). 
 272. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1034.  The Forest Service responded to comments that expressed 
concern that the agency developed its 2005 planning rule without consulting a committee of 
scientists by stating that it was not required to seek the advice of a scientific committee in 
revising the planning rule, and that actually the 1999 committee report was the basis for the rule 
because “[s]ustainability, public participation, adaptive management, monitoring and 
evaluation, the role of science, and the objection process, all concepts in the proposed and final 
rule, were recommendations of that report.”  Id. 
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documents, without any resulting on-the-ground effects.273  The 
regulatory preamble noted that the Ohio Forestry decision described 
forest plans as “tools for agency planning and management” that “do 
not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing 
anything; they do not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal 
license power or authority; they do not subject anyone to any civil or 
criminal liability; they create no legal rights or obligations.”274  
Borrowing language from the Court’s opinion in SUWA, the 
regulatory preamble described land use plans as “‘tools by which 
‘present and future use is projected’” and a more general “statement 
of priorities.”275 
The 2005 planning rule seemingly emphasized flexibility over 
enforceability,276 replacing “standards” established in the 2000 
planning rule with the vaguer term “guidelines,”277 and expanding the 
discretionary authority of agency officials, while reducing the 
enforceability of a plan’s provisions against the agency.  For example, 
an agency decision to deviate from a forest plan’s guidelines will no 
longer require a plan amendment.278  In contrast to the abandoned 
2000 planning rule’s emphasis on science-based decision making and 
ecological sustainability, the 2005 planning rule called for maximum 
administrative discretion and decision-making efficiency.279  The 2005 
rule emphasized the “strategic nature” of forest plans and claimed 
 273. Id.  The regulatory preamble stated that “[u]nder the Final Rule, plans will continue to 
be strategic in nature, as described by the Supreme Court in Ohio Forestry and SUWA.”  Id. 
 274. Id. (citing Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733 (1998)).  The 
regulatory preamble also noted that in SUWA, the “Supreme Court also recently recognized the 
similar nature of land management plans,” noting that “like a [Forest Service] land management 
plan, a BLM plan typically ‘is not a final implementation decision on actions.’”  National Forest 
System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 Planning Rule, 70 Fed. 
Reg. at 1034. 
 275. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1034. 
 276. See Martin Nie, The 2005 National Forest System Land and Resource Management 
Planning Regulations: Comments and Analysis, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 99, 100 
(2006) (noting that the 2005 rule replaced the “legally enforceable standards” of earlier 
iterations of its planning regulations with “general recommendations,” replacing former 
requirements that the agency “shall” take certain actions with language that the agency 
“should” proceed in a particular manner – frustrating legal challenges). 
 277. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1026.  The 1982 planning rule referred to plan provisions as both 
“standards and guidelines.”  Id. 
 278. See id.  (claiming that “[i]f deviation from plan guidelines is appropriate in specific 
circumstances, the rationale for deviation should be based on project or activity analysis and 
explained fully . . . [h]owever, deviation does not require an amendment to the plan”). 
 279. See Nie, supra note 276, at 100. 
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that forest plans “do not authorize project and activity decisions, but 
rather characterize general future conditions and guidance for such 
decisions.”280  The rule acknowledged that the Forest Service might 
implement some on-the-ground decisions when a forest plan is 
approved, revised, or amended, although it predicted that those 
situations would involve “extraordinary circumstances.”281  The rule 
failed to explain what constituted “extraordinary circumstances,” or 
how the agency would handle forest plan provisions having 
immediate on the ground effects under a planning rule designed to 
develop plans with no anticipated effects. 
The Forest Service described its 2005 planning rule as 
“represent[ing] a paradigm shift in planning”282 — which it certainly 
attempted.  The rule represented a radical shift from NFMA’s 
congressional intent that forest plans were to be meaningful, 
prescriptive, judicially-enforceable documents, prepared with public 
participation and in a manner consistent with NEPA specifications.283  
Congress envisioned NFMA forest planning as involving the public in 
forest management decisions at the forest planning stage, well before 
the Forest Service might assume a role of project proponent for a site-
specific action.284  The idea was to place checks on the Forest Service’s 
previously unquestioned management decisions.285  But the 2005 
planning rule seemed to contravene NMFA’s intent by increasing 
 280. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 
Planning Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. at 1025. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 1033. 
 283. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text (discussing how Congress intended to 
alter its relationship with the Forest Service in NFMA by subjecting the agency to significant 
oversight). 
 284. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2000) (requiring public participation in the “development, 
review, and revision of land management plans”); Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law 
Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1175 
(2005) (discussing increased public participation requirements in 1970s-era environmental 
legislation, including NFMA); see also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (noting the 
Senate committee report on NFMA included a statement indicating public should be involved 
in land management planning “at all levels” of the planning process). 
 285. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 70 (noting that during the Senate 
hearings on NFMA in 1976, Senator Humphrey “observed that the Forest Service’s record had 
brought into question the extent to which the agency could be trusted to guard and manage 
public resources”).  Other members of Congress shared the perception that the Forest Service 
needed additional oversight.  For example, Senator Floyd Haskell (D. Colo.) stated that with 
NFMA, “the era of full delegation of land management decision-making authority to federal 
agencies is over.”  Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 583, 94TH CONG., 1st Sess. (1975)). 
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agency discretion and weakening the planning process by the 
elimination of judicially enforceable standards.286 
The proposed rule generated some 195,000 public comments287 
and faced fierce opposition, including a proposed House amendment 
to a 2003 Interior appropriations bill, an effort that ultimately 
failed.288  But an environmentalist challenge to the 2005 rule produced 
a 2007 injunction issued by the federal district court for the Northern 
District of California.289  This injunction prevented the Forest Service 
from implementing the 2005 rule until it complied with NFMA, 
NEPA, and the ESA.290  In response to this decision, the Forest 
Service indicated its intent to comply with NEPA by producing an 
EIS for the 2005 rule.291 
Even if the Forest Service were to succeed in overturning this 
decision on appeal, or were to remedy the defects in its 2005 rule, the 
rule’s effect on judicial review of forest plans will be delayed because 
any actions taken under forest plans adopted under the 1982 planning 
regulation must continue to comply with that regulation, not the 2005 
 286. Nie, supra note 276, at 105. 
 287. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning; Removal of 2000 
Planning Rule, Forest 70 Fed. Reg. at 1034. 
 288. See U.S. House of Representatives Roll Call Vote 384 (July 17, 2003), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2003/roll384.xml (recording the vote for Rep. Udall’s proposed 
amendment to the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 
2004, H.R. 2691,108th Cong. (1st Session 2003), which was intended to block funding to 
implement the Bush Administration’s proposed changes to NFMA, which was defeated by a 198 
to 223 vote). 
 289. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1100 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
 290. Id.  The court also held that the Forest Service failed to provide adequate notice and 
comment on the 2005 rule, violating the APA, concluding that the “law is clear that an agency 
cannot promulgate without notice and comment a final rule that constitutes a ‘paradigm shift’ 
from the proposed rule for which there was notice and comment.”  Id. at 1076.  The court 
concluded that the Forest Service violated NEPA when it employed a CX that was 
inappropriate, and the court found the fact that the Forest Service subsequently issued a new 
CX covering forest planning to “support[] the conclusion that the prior [CX] that was utilized in 
this case did not fit the 2005 rule.”  Id. at 1087.  In addition, the court held that the Forest 
Service violated the ESA when it concluded that the 2005 rule would not affect listed species 
without first initiating section 7 consultation to determine whether the rule “may affect” listed 
species.  Id. at 1091.  See also Enviros Will Likely Contest FS Rule on no Planning EIS, PUBLIC 
LAND NEWS, Jan. 5, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.plnfpr.com/newsletter1/P107 
Jan5.htm#PG3 (discussing the likelihood of environmentalists amending their complaint to 
contest the 2006 forest plan CX). 
 291. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 72 Fed. Reg. 26,775, 26,775 (May 
11, 2007) (noting that the Forest Service plans to produce a draft EIS by June 2007 and 
complete a final EIS for the 2005 rule by November 2007). 
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rule.292  Although the Forest Service has argued the 2005 regulations 
apply to management decisions for existing forest plans approved and 
implemented according to the 1982 regulations, several district court 
decisions indicate that forest plans will continue to be governed by 
the 1982 regulations, not the 2005 regulations, until the Forest Service 
either revises the applicable land use plan or promulgates a new 
one.293 
B. The Proliferation of Categorical Exclusions 
NEPA directs federal agencies to analyze the effects of any 
“major [f]ederal action significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment”294 in an environmental impact statement (EIS) on that 
action.295  Agencies need not prepare an EIS on every federal 
action—that would create an administrative nightmare.296  The 
 292. Site-specific actions adopted according to the 2004 “interpretive rule” are governed by 
the 2000 rule’s “transition provisions” – not the 1982 rule – unless a site-specific decision 
specifically adopts the standards from the 1982 rule.  See Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. United States 
Forest Serv., 451 F. 3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (ruling that a forest plan may require by 
reference particular standards “regardless of later changes in the regulations” and concluding 
that the 1982 regulations did not apply to a timber sale when the applicable forest plan did not 
adopt any specific regulatory provision by reference); Utah Envtl. Cong. v. Troyer, 479 F. 3d 
1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that when a forest plan adopted the 1982 rules by 
reference, that rule governed subsequent actions taken under the plan).  See also supra  notes 
269-270 (discussing the 2004 interpretive rule and the 2000 rule’s transition provisions). 
 293. See Idaho Wildlife Fed’n v. Tower, No. CV-04-372-E-BLW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23140, at *4 (D. Idaho April 13, 2006) (holding that the 1982 regulation governed a forest plan 
adopted under that regulation, rejecting a Forest Service argument that the environmentalists’ 
claim that the agency failed to maintain sage grouse viability in the Curlew National Grassland, 
a Management Indicator Species (MIS), was moot because the Forest Service did not have the 
same obligations toward MIS under the 2005 rules as under the 1982 regulation); Sierra Nevada 
Forest Prot. Campaign v. Tippin, No. Civ. S 06-00351 FCD DAD, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57832, 
at *47 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (rejecting the Forest Service’s argument that the 2005 rules 
applied to the timber project, and holding that a forest plan prepared under the 1982 planning 
regulation continued to govern the forest plan and projects it authorized).  See also Utah Envtl. 
Cong. v. Bosworth, 439 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the Forest Service’s 
management obligations for projects in the Fishlake National Forest under the 1982 regulations 
because the Forest Service adopted the forest plan under those regulations). 
 294. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000). 
 295. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1-1502.25 (2007) (stating requirements for when and how to 
prepare an EIS).  The regulations state that the “primary purpose of an environmental impact 
statement is to serve as an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in 
[NEPA] are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.”  Id. § 
1502.1. 
 296. See id § 1501.4 (establishing criteria for agencies to use to determine whether an EIS is 
necessary for a proposed action).  In lieu of preparing an EIS, agencies may prepare a shorter 
environmental assessment (EA) and, if the EA concludes that the action will not have 
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Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) regulations 
implementing NEPA allow federal agencies to determine categories 
of actions that do not have the potential to affect the environment297 
and authorize agencies to issue CXs that exempt actions from 
individual environmental review.298  In recent years, the Bush 
Administration has employed CXs to exempt numerous types of 
federal land management decisions which decades of past agency 
practice suggested warrant individual environmental review because 
of their potentially signi
In 2003, the Bush Administration assembled a NEPA Task 
Force, which released a report to the Council on Environmental 
Quality299 recommending, among other things, expanded use of 
CXs.300  The Administration began to introduce a number of CXs for 
public lands activities that would previously have required 
individualized environmental review.301  For example, in connection 
with its Healthy Forests Initiative, the Forest Service issued CXs for 
“hazardous fuels reduction” projects and post-fire salvage logging, as 
well as for “thinning” projects intended to reduce fire risk.302  The 
significant environmental effects, the agency will issue a finding of no significant impact 
(FONSI).  Id. §§ 1508.9, .13. 
 297. Id. § 1507.3(b)(2)(ii). 
 298. Id. § 1508.4.  The regulation defines CX as “a category of actions which do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment . . . and for 
which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement 
is required.”  Id. 
 299. NEPA Task Force, The NEPA Task Force Report to the Council on Environmental 
Quality: Modernizing NEPA Implementation 1–3 (2003), available at http://www.nepa.gov/ 
ntf/report/htmltoc.html. 
 300. See Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 353 (discussing how the Forest Service created new 
categories of CXs as part of the Healthy Forests Initiative).  These CXs “appeared to be a 
preemptive strike by the Administration, with the dual aim of accelerating the pace of forest 
thinning and salvage logging by eliminating environmental review and taking the underlying 
public policy disputes off the table by categorically declaring environmental impact analysis off-
limits.”  Id. at 353–54; Jesse B. Davis, The Healthy Forests Initiative: Unhealthy Policy Choices in 
Forest and Fire Management, 34 ENVLT. L. 1209, 1224-28 (2004) (describing how, as part of the 
Healthy Forests Initiative, the Forest Service issued CXs for post-fire salvage operations and 
hazardous fuels reduction, as well as CXs for timber harvests that include up to 70 acres of live 
trees, salvage up to 250 acres of dead, dying, or fire-damaged trees, and allow up to 250 acres of 
trees to be cut to control insects or disease). 
 301. See DREHER, supra note 27, at 7-8 (discussing recent proposals to weaken or create 
exemptions from NEPA requirements, including a “rebuttable presumption” in the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 that the oil and gas activities fall under a CX, an appropriations bill rider 
allowing the renewal of grazing permits in national forests over the next three years without 
NEPA review, and a proposed CX for forest plans drafted under the 2005 planning rule). 
 302. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Fire Management 
Activities; Categorical Exclusions, 68 Fed. Reg. 33,814, passim (Jun. 5, 2003). 
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Forest Service opened the door for such CXs in 2002 by issuing a 
“clarification” of when “extraordinary circumstances” would require 
environmental analysis for an action that typically fell within the 
scope of a CX.303  Under the Forest Service Handbook, a CX is 
appropriate for an action when there are no “extraordinary 
circumstances” present.304  The revised Handbook definition of 
“extraordinary circumstances” gave the agency discretion to 
determine whether a CX applied to a proposed action, even where 
resource conditions created “extraordinary circumstances” that would 
otherwise make a CX inappropriate.305 
In December 2006, the Forest Service continued its overhaul of 
NFMA forest planning by issuing an interim CX for forest plans, plan 
amendments, and plan revisions.306  The agency claimed that SUWA 
and Ohio Forestry provided the legal basis for its conclusion that an 
EIS was not required on forest plans, since the agency made no 
binding commitments in forest plans, and its plans had no site-specific 
effects.307  Citing the “strategic nature” of plans, the regulatory 
preamble to the 2005 planning regulations stated that the Court’s 
decisions “support the Forest Service’s conclusion that its land 
management plans developed under the 2005 planning rule that 
typically will not have independent environmental effects, and thus 
will not have significant environmental effects.”308  By recasting forest 
 303. Clarification of Extraordinary Circumstances for Categories of Actions Excluded from 
Documentation in an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,622, 54,623 (Aug. 23, 2002). 
 304. Id. at 54,627 (noting that “[ex]traordinary circumstances” exist in the presence of 
resource conditions such as species protected under the ESA are present in an area; flood 
plains, wetlands, or municipal watersheds; wilderness areas, WSAs, or national recreation areas; 
inventoried roadless areas; research natural areas; American Indian or Alaska Native religious 
and cultural sites; and archaeological sites, historic properties, or areas); Forest Service 
Handbook § 1909.15, ch. 30.3(2) (2007). 
 305. Forest Service Handbook, supra note 304; see also Eric E. Huber, Environmental 
Litigation and the Healthy Forests Initiative, 29 VT. L. REV. 797, 802 (2005).  The Forest Service 
issued the 2005 planning rule itself under a CX established in the Forest Service Handbook.  See 
supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the Forest Service’s decision not to undertake 
NEPA analysis of the planning rule). 
 306. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, 
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,481, 75,481 
(Dec. 15, 2006). 
 307. Plan Categorical Exclusion Questions and Answers 2, http://www.fs.fed.us/emc/ 
plan_ce/includes/q_as.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2007). 
 308. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Developing, Revising, 
or Amending Land Management Plans; Categorical Exclusion, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,483. 
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plans as mere vision statements,309 the Forest Service eviscerated any 
meaningful analysis of the environmental effects of national forest 
land planning. 
Two months later, in February 2007, the Forest Service issued 
another CX in a directive concluding that certain oil and natural gas 
exploration and development activities had no potential to have any 
significant effects on the environment.310  Critics charged that this 
decision to carry out the president’s policy of expedited review for 
energy-related projects, as articulated in Executive Order 13212 
(2001),311 was yet another example of the Bush Administration 
chipping away at environmental review of Forest Service decisions.312 
V.  CONCLUSION 
By enacting NFMA and FLPMA thirty years ago, Congress 
committed public land managers to comprehensive land planning.  
 309. Id. at 75,485 (describing how components of plans developed under the 2005 planning 
rule, such as “desired conditions” describe “a vision for the desired condition of the forest” but 
do not create binding commitments for the agency).  Interestingly, BLM’s regulations continue 
to require an EIS on its land use plans.  43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6 (2006).  Therefore, until the agency 
amends these regulations, a CX on BLM land plans would be unlawful. 
 310. National Environmental Policy Act Documentation Needed for Oil and Natural Gas 
Exploration and Development Activities (Categorical Exclusion), 72 Fed. Reg. 7391, 7392 (Feb. 
15, 2007). 
 311. Id. at 7392 (noting that the Forest Service’s CX applied to additional activities to those 
already categorically excluded from NEPA analysis under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which 
created a CE for five categories of oil and gas exploration and development activities conducted 
under the Mineral Leasing Act). 
 312. See Forest Service Says Oil and Gas NEPA Exclusion Doesn’t End Run Law, PUBLIC 
LAND NEWS, Mar. 2, 2007, at 9, available at http://www.plnfpr.com/newsletter1/P507 
March2.htm#PG9 (quoting Mike Anderson, senior resource analyst for The Wilderness Society, 
to the effect that Forest Service officials are “being dishonest when they say they don’t need to 
do NEPA in plans because they will do NEPA at the project level, but then they don’t do it at 
the project level as well”).  The oil and gas CX applies to decisions to approve a surface use plan 
of operations for oil and natural gas activities, and any initial development activities, so long as 
the approval will not result in more than one mile of new road construction or reconstruction, 
more than three miles of pipelines, or more than four drill sites.  National Environmental Policy 
Act Documentation Needed for Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Development Activities 
(Categorical Exclusion), 72 Fed. Reg. at 7402.  BLM has likewise proposed expanding its use of 
CXs to include grazing permit renewals, four new forestry CXs (three based on CXs already 
issued by the Forest Service), three new CXs for oil, gas, and geothermal energy development 
activities, and new categories of CXs for recreation management and emergency stabilization.  
National Environmental Policy Act Revised Implementing Procedures, 71 Fed. Reg. 4159, 4160 
(Jan. 25, 2006).  See also Brodie Farquhar, Grazing, Seismic Permits Fall Under Plan, CASPER 
STAR-TRIBUNE, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://www.trib.com/articles/2006/01/27/news/ 
wyoming/557115e50dfe893972571030006de47.txt (discussing BLM’s proposed CXs and noting 
that three of the four forestry CXs mirrored those adopted by the Forest Service). 
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The benefits of planning as a prerequisite to public land decision 
making are many.  The planning process attracts public attention 
when the focus of land management is on the resources an area 
possesses, not on the merits of a particular project.  Without a project 
and its momentum, agency personnel are in a posture of unbiased 
managers rather than project proponents.  Moreover, at the planning 
stage, with an areawide concentration and a focus on land resources, 
the cumulative effects of various potential resource developments can 
be evaluated without pressure from project sponsors.  The planning 
process, in short, can encourage rational decision making in advance 
of specific land use decisions.  It can also produce predictability, but 
only if the plan provisions are specific enough to allocate resources.  
Congress embraced this vision of the benefits of public land planning 
in 1976 when it passed both NFMA313 and FLPMA.314 
But the landscape of public land planning in the 21st century has 
been changed dramatically by both the Supreme Court and the Bush 
Administration.  In Ohio Forestry, the Court decided that forest plans 
were not ripe for review unless the challenged provision would have 
on-the-ground effects, and SUWA held that land use plans are not 
generally judicially enforceable.  Both decisions sharply curtailed the 
public’s ability to challenge the consistency of land plans with 
governing statutes.  Under the now-enjoined 2005 planning 
regulations and the accompanying CX, the Forest Service could 
approve a forest plan without analyzing any environmental effects.  
Because most land use plan terms are now effectively unenforceable 
under SUWA, the public must wait until a specific provision in a land 
plan is produces a site-specific action to challenge that provision. 
The Forest Service used the SUWA and Ohio Forestry opinions 
to justify its radical revision of forest planning in the 2005 planning 
rules and its decisions to exempt a number of projects from 
environmental review.315  These decisions run contrary to 
congressional intent to make federal land planning the focal point of 
both NFMA and FLPMA.316  Instead of promoting informed decision 
 313. Pub. L. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976). 
 314. Pub. L. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976). 
 315. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text (discussing how the Forest Service used 
the Court’s decisions to support its 2005 planning rule); supra notes 307-08 and accompanying 
text (discussing how the Forest Service used the Court’s decision in the 2006 CE for forest plans 
adopted under the new rule). 
 316. See supra notes 52-74 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent in 
adopting NFMA and FLPMA). 
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making and restraining agency discretion with increased public 
oversight and the potential for judicial enforcement, land planning 
has devolved into a series of virtually meaningless exercises 
undertaken with minimal public involvement, little judicial 
enforceability, and increased administrative discretion in the name of 
“efficiency” and “flexibility.” 
Federal land managers should not be allowed to abandon land 
use planning as Congress envisioned it thirty years ago until Congress 
rejects that vision.  Regrettably, recent Supreme Court decisions and 
the Bush Administration’s actions make it necessary for Congress to 
respond to the SUWA, Ohio Forestry, and the 2005 forest planning 
regulations by revising the vague planning directives in NFMA and 
FLPMA with language that recognizes the critical importance of 
federal land plans as significant and ongoing agency actions within the 
meaning of the APA.  We suggest specific amendments to the APA 
to accomplish these goals in the Appendix to this article.  These 
proposed amendments would (1) assure that federal land plans would 
again fulfill the original congressional goals of being the product of 
active public participation, (2) focus on rigorous environmental 
analysis, and (3) create enforceable commitments by federal land 
management agencies.  Without such amendments to the APA, 
federal land planning in the 21st century will devolve into an expensive 
charade that wastes taxpayer dollars and deceives the public. 
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APPENDIX 
To amend the definition of “agency action” contained in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(13) to add to the definition of agency action, as follows 
(references are to explanatory notes and accompanying text of this 
article; existing language in italics): 
(13) “agency action” includes the whole or a part of an agency 
rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, 
or failure to act; discrete agency actions that are ripe for judicial 
review include: 
A. approving or amending federal land management plans, 
which are binding compacts with the public (n. 240), and 
which generally require preparation of an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) or supplemental EIS that considers 
the effects of the plan on listed an candidate species under 
the Endangered Species Act, including new species added to 
the list (nn. 178, 186, 214) and designated or potential river 
segments for protection under the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act (nn. 175, 199-203, 236), in order to satisfy the National 
Environmental Policy Act; 
B. implementing commitments in approved federal land 
management plans, including monitoring requirements (nn. 
131-32, 177, 182, 234, 246) and complying with state law (nn. 
231-32); 
C. approving site-specific actions consistent with applicable 
federal land management plans, including licenses, permits, 
timber sales (nn. 221-22, 254), rights-of-way, and similar 
actions; 
D. maintaining a current inventory of all federal lands and 
resources, including an inventory of lands suitable for 
inclusion in the national wilderness system (nn. 172, 182, 193-
95, 198, 246), and annual species reviews (nn. 223-25); 
E. approving or amending allotment management plans (n. 255) 
or annual operating instructions to grazing permittees (nn. 
204, 252). 
F. approving and implementing standards for managing 
livestock grazing consistent with ecological criteria (nn. 191-
92); and 
G. discovery of listed endangered species on federal lands (nn. 
178, 186, 210). 
